


























This report puts forward the analysis and recommendations for the design and 
implementation of a forward-looking policy on software vulnerability disclosure 
(SVD) in Europe. It is the result of extensive deliberations among the members 
of a Task Force formed by CEPS in September 2017, including industry experts, 
representatives of EU and international institutions, academics, civil society 
organisations and practitioners.
Drawing on current best practices throughout Europe, the US and Japan, the 
Task Force explored ways to formulate practical guidelines for governments 
and businesses to harmonise the process of handling SVD throughout Europe. 
These discussions led to policy recommendations addressed to member states 
and the EU institutions for the development of an effective policy framework 
for introducing coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) and government 
disclosure decision processes (GDDP) in Europe. 
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Cybersecurity is a hot topic of debate in today’s policy circles. The abuse of 
software vulnerabilities is a growing concern that needs to be urgently 
addressed with better solutions, as increasing numbers of devices and people 
are connected to the internet every day. This CEPS Task Force report offers the 
first comprehensive account of the various measures EU member states are 
taking to counter these challenges. It also offers practical recommendations on 
how to improve the coordination and disclosure of software vulnerabilities by 
both private-sector and public actors. 
Vulnerability disclosure has been the subject of a decades-long debate in 
the information security community. The American cryptographer Bruce 
Schneider said in the late 1990s that “full disclosure is a damn good idea”. 
Today, the notion prevails that responsible disclosure should be done in a 
coordinated fashion, which takes into consideration that publicly releasing all 
vulnerability details can result in negative consequences for users. The private 
sector is responsible not only for developing the best possible software, but also 
for responsibly handling vulnerabilities whenever they are discovered. 
We live in an age in which vulnerabilities are leaked by criminals, with 
potentially geopolitical motives, and when certain governments are stockpiling 
vulnerabilities to develop offensive cyber-weapons. This cannot be done in an 
accountability vacuum. Transparent decision-making processes are now needed 
in order to preserve the rule of law online and to hold government bodies 
accountable. Each EU member state needs to have an operational framework in 
place that guides their intelligence agencies in using and disclosing software 
vulnerabilities. 
Thirteen EU member states are currently contemplating the creation of a 
national coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy (CVD). Two countries have 
already a CVD policy, and the remaining member states have no immediate 
plans in this area. Hopefully this report will contribute to the streamlining and 
rationalising of these existing efforts and encourage others to adopt their own 
CVD policy. Reaching agreement on a common, European approach is the key 
to avoiding a fragmented Digital Single Market and to preserving network and 
information security. To achieve that, it would be beneficial to agree on a single 
interpretation of what constitutes illegal access to a computer system and to 
develop a legal exception for security researchers in many areas of relevant EU 
law, including copyright law, e-evidence, cybercrime and the EU’s export 
control regulation. Vulnerability disclosure is a horizontal policy issue, which 
deserves the attention of policy-makers dealing with a wide range of topics. 
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The CEPS Task Force on Software Vulnerabilities Disclosure has 
benefitted from the knowledge of experts representing EU governments, 
technology companies, civil society and academia. This multi-stakeholder 
approach reflects a recognition of the need to bring various people together and 
holistically assess how intended solutions are working out in practice. Our work 
aims to benefit Europeans by allowing them to connect without being fearful 
that any vulnerabilities in their devices will be abused by either companies or 
the very governments representing them. 
 
Marietje Schaake, Chair of the Task Force 
 Member of the European Parliament 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
his report puts forward the analysis, policy implications and main 
recommendations for the design and implementation of a forward-
looking policy on software vulnerability disclosure (SVD) in Europe. It is 
the result of a collective effort led by CEPS, which in September 2017 formed a 
Task Force on Software Vulnerability Disclosure in Europe, composed of 
industry experts, representatives of EU and international institutions, 
academics, civil society organisations and practitioners (see a list of participants 
in Annex 1). Meeting on four separate occasions in the period between 
September 2017 and February 2018, the group explored ways to formulate 
practical guidelines for governments and businesses to harmonise the process of 
handling SVD throughout Europe. These discussions led to policy 
recommendations addressed to member states and the EU institutions for the 
development of an effective policy framework for introducing coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure (CVD) and government disclosure decision processes 
(GDDP) in Europe.  
Based on its examination of current best practices throughout Europe, the 
US and Japan, the Task Force recommends implementation of various policies 
related to SVD. Part I of this report concentrates on CVD and Part II focuses on 
GDDP. 
CVD policy 
The Task Force calls upon the European Commission and the member states to 
collectively draft a European-level framework complemented by national 
legislation in accordance with the guidelines and recommendations defined in 
ISO/IEC 29147:2014 and ISO/IEC 30111 in order to provide legal clarity for 
software vulnerability discovery and disclosure. The Nationaal Cyber Security 
Centrum (NCSC) in the Netherlands has published a general guideline for 
responsible disclosure, which can serve as a useful model that EU member states 
can follow in drafting their own responsible disclosure policy. In addition, it 
gives security researchers guidance on how to act in finding and reporting a 
vulnerability.1 
                                                        
1  See https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/news/responsible-disclosure-guideline. 
html. 
T
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE IN EUROPE | vi 
The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Template from the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the US 
Department of Commerce could also offer helpful suggestions.2 
It is also worth mentioning that the US Department of Justice 
(Cybersecurity Unit, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the 
Criminal Division) released in July 2017 the first version of a framework for a 
Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Online Systems.3 This framework could 
serve as a possible model for EU member states to consider adopting. 
Recognising that different organisations may have different goals and priorities 
for their vulnerability disclosure programs, the US framework does not dictate 
the form of or the objectives for vulnerability disclosure. Instead, it outlines a 
process for designing a vulnerability disclosure program that will clearly 
describe authorised vulnerability disclosure and discovery behaviour, thereby 
substantially reducing the likelihood that such described activities will result in 
a civil or criminal prosecution.  
The Task Force recommends that national computer emergency response 
teams (CERTs) should put in place frameworks that are similar to the ones 
adopted in the Netherlands and the US. Moreover, such frameworks should be 
prominently announced on the websites of organisations that establish a CVD, 
which researchers can consult and rely on for legal certainty. 
Policy recommendations from the Task Force 
Implementation of CVD in Europe 
EU legislation 
1. Amending Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems 
(the EU cybercrime Directive) to support CVD. 
2. Protection of security researchers. Researchers involved in vulnerability 
discovery are often exposed to criminal or civil liability.4 The legal liability 
and responsibilities of security researchers should be fully clarified to 
enable them to continue their work without fear of prosecution.  
3. Incentives for security researchers. Appropriate policies should be 
adopted with the aim of encouraging ‘white-hat hackers’ to actively 
participate in coordinated vulnerability disclosure programmes.  
                                                        
2 See https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_vuln_disclosure_early_stage_ 
template.pdf 
3 See https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/983996/download. 
4 See https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/25/hungarian-hacker-arrested-for-pressing-f12/. 
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4. Directive on security of network information systems (NIS). In 
transposing the NIS Directive, particularly its Article 14, member states 
may explicitly consider including CVD as one of the technical and 
organisational measures.  
5. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). According to the GDPR, 
software owners and tech firms become data controllers when they 
exercise overall control over the purpose for which, and the manner in 
which personal data are processed. Assuming that irresponsible handling 
of vulnerabilities could lead to personal data breaches falling within the 
scope of GDPR, CVD should be viewed as one of the necessary tools to 
mitigate the relevant risks.  
6. Cybersecurity Act. According to the proposed Regulation submitted in 
October 2017 by the European Commission concerning the European 
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) and cybersecurity 
certification, in its coordination and capacity-building roles, ENISA can 
contribute to the harmonised development of CVD in the EU by having 
its mandate amended, thereby allowing it to engage in the following 
activities:  
 Writing EU-wide guidelines for the reporting process, addressing 
the issues it raised in its January 2017 “Good Practice Guide on 
Vulnerability Disclosure” report;5 
 Installing and operating a web portal where disclosure of software 
and hardware vulnerabilities can be coordinated at the European 
level and contributed to anonymously;  
 Building a team of ‘white-hat hackers’ who would conduct 
campaigns in coordination with EU member States to assist EU 
member states and operators of essential services to mitigate 
software vulnerabilities, with the objective of increasing the security 
of critical infrastructure; 
 Implementing training in all issues that may arise in the context of 
CVD, e.g. technical, legal, etc., to build capacity on CVD in the EU; 
and 
 Liaising formally with other key international actors on CVD in 
order to enhance cooperation, collaboration and the sharing of best 
practices. 
Furthermore, Article 47 (1)j of the Cybersecurity Act states that a European 
cybersecurity certification scheme is expected to include inter alia "rules 
                                                        
5 See https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/vulnerability-disclosure. 
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concerning how previously undetected cybersecurity vulnerabilities in ICT 
products and services are to be reported and dealt with." This provision of the 
Cybersecurity Act provides the possibility to introduce CVD in a European 
Cybersecurity Certification Scheme, which in fact may encourage CVD as a 
standard practice.  
7. Software vulnerabilities in durable goods such as cars and medical 
devices 
 The European Commission should amend the radio equipment 
Directive so that Article 3 paragraph 3 provides that “radio equipment 
is cybersecure by design, by default and by implementation”. 
 The Commission should incorporate the standards for vulnerability 
management (ISO 29174, 30111) directly into the CE mark system.  
National legislation 
8. Amending national legislation to support CVD. As a medium-to-long-
term solution and given that the revision of the EU cybercrime Directive 
(from 2013) may take several years, the Task Force advises member states 
to consider amending their national legislation bearing on CVD, using the 
framework on CVD introduced in the Netherlands as a model. 
EU research funding 
9. Framework Programmes for Research and Innovation. The various 
European Framework Programmes for Research and Innovation offer 
several ways to leverage funding to promote CVD among public and 
private researchers in Europe. For instance, the following H2020 calls 
described in the Work Programme 2018-2020 could be used to finance 
research and innovation in this area: 
 SU-ICT-03-2018: Establishing and operating a pilot project to create 
a Cybersecurity Competence Network  
 SU-DS02-2020: Management of cyber-attacks and other risks  
 SU-DS03-2019-2020: Digital security and privacy for citizens and 
small and medium enterprises and micro enterprises 
 SU-DS04-2018-2020: Cybersecurity in the Electrical Power and 
Energy System (EPES) 
 SU-DS05-2018-2019: Digital security, privacy, data protection and 
accountability in critical sectors  
The next Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, FP9, 
should also provide explicit funding for CVD across Europe. 
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Recommendations to implement government disclosure decision processes (GDDP) 
in Europe 
In the course of their day-to-day functioning, governments often acquire 
insights into vulnerabilities. Thus, ensuring that governments and their agencies 
have strong policies for reviewing and coordinating the disclosure of 
vulnerabilities is a critical norm that should be advanced within the EU. It 
appears, however, that most member states have not yet implemented a 
government disclosure decision process (GDDP). 
GDDP characteristics. The Task Force recommends that all member states 
adopt the following policies and practices to inform the GDDP activities of their 
government institutions and agencies: 
10. All security vulnerabilities should be subject to a government 
vulnerability disclosure review process.6 
11. All relevant ministries, including those with missions for user, business 
and government security, should participate in the GDDP and 
participants should work together using a standard set of criteria to ensure 
that all risks and interests are considered. 
12. The policies, practices and findings of the GDDP should be subject to 
independent oversight and transparency. Regular public reporting should 
be viewed as a critical part of this. 
13. The executive secretariat of the GDDP should be housed within a civilian 
agency with expertise in existing coordinated vulnerability disclosure. 
14. The GDDP should be codified in law or other legally binding policy to 
ensure compliance and permanence. 
15. Any non-disclosure agreement with contractors, resellers or security 
researchers should be prohibited, and any other exceptions should be 
limited (e.g. for ultra-sensitive issues). 
16. Any decision to delay disclosure of a vulnerability should be reviewed at 
least every six months. 
17. The default policy should be to disclose vulnerabilities immediately to the 
affected vendor(s) so they can be patched.  
18. Where the vulnerability potentially affects the safety of regulated 
products (such as cars, medical devices or railway signals), the relevant 
EU safety and standards bodies should be involved in the GDDP.  
 
                                                        
6 Vulnerabilities identified through security researcher activity and incident response that are 
intended to be disclosed in a rapid fashion should not be subject to adjudication by GDDP 
review. 
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ENISA can play a vital role in sharing best practices in GDDP and assisting and 
advising member states in their implementation.  
Survey of member states’ GDDP. It might also be useful for the European 
Commission or ENISA to conduct a study of member states’ efforts to 
implement GDDP. A better understanding of how member states are handling 
vulnerabilities will contribute to a more robust and informed debate about 
cybersecurity in Europe and the types of measures that are needed to improve 
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The year 2018 kicked off with two of the worst computer security flaws ever 
experienced – Meltdown and Spectre – which affect nearly every computer chip 
manufactured in the last 20 years. And last year, people all over the world 
became familiar with the names of malicious ransomware, such as Wannacry 
and Petya, which block access to a computer system until a sum of money is 
paid. We also learned that the personal information of nearly 146 million 
Americans was compromised by a hacker who took advantage of a security flaw 
in software used by Equifax that had not been patched.  
Today, software is embedded everywhere: in our smartphones, our cars, 
our offices and our homes. This fact of 21st century life means that most software 
and software-based products are susceptible to vulnerabilities (see definitions of 
key terms in section 1.3). It has been estimated that the average programme has 
at least 14 separate points of vulnerability.7  Each of those weaknesses could 
permit an attacker to compromise the integrity of the product and exploit it for 
personal gain. Therefore, software vulnerabilities and their timely patching pose 
a serious concern for everyone. What can we do to protect ourselves? Who 
should look for vulnerabilities and should the vendors or the users be informed 
about them? 
The debate on how to handle the disclosure of insecurities pre-dates 
software security. It can be traced back to the locksmiths and lock-picking in 
England in the 1850s. In his book, The Rudimentary Treatise on the Construction of 
Locks, locksmith Alfred Hobbes argued that “it is to the interest of honest persons 
to know about [insecurities], because the dishonest are tolerably certain to be the 
first to apply the knowledge practically”. And for several decades now, this 
issue has been the subject of broad debate in the information security arena. 
But the extraordinary events of early this year have created a heightened 
sense of anxiety and urgency on this issue. Moreover, with the development of 
the “Internet of Things” (IoT) and billions of devices connected to the internet, 
software plays an ever-greater role in our daily lives. Indeed, as industries and 
                                                        
7 “The myth of cyber-security”, The Economist, 8 April 2017, p. 9. 
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infrastructure become more digitalised and connected, the attack surface 
becomes broader, which greatly increases the potential impact of vulnerabilities 
on the ecosystem. Large attacks, such as Wannacry, have shown that 
vulnerabilities can be used to construct exploits that can put unprecedented 
pressure on critical infrastructure and more broadly to threaten the integrity, 
availability and confidentiality of data and the smooth provision of essential 
services. As the saying goes: “Phones and laptops don’t kill many people 
directly: cars and medical devices do.”8 
Many of these smart systems and devices (refrigerators, medical devices 
and cars) are expected to be operational for many years or even decades with a 
minimum of intervention. They also make extensive use of third-party libraries 
in integrated products, which act as a black box whose security is difficult to 
analyse. Therefore, industry, government and researchers should start thinking 
of how to effectively merge safety with security to ensure sustainability in 
software and in the supporting tool-chains.9 This process presents numerous 
challenges, including vulnerabilities research and disclosure. 
Where does Europe stand on the debate and practices on vulnerability 
research and disclosure?  
In 2016, the European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security (ENISA) published a report, 10  presenting the current situation on 
vulnerability disclosure, the challenges related to this process and some 
recommendations to address the challenges and increase adoption of good 
practices.  
The Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, and in 
particular the Cyber and Digital Citizens’ Security Unit, carried out research on 
the vulnerability disclosure process. In the first quarter of 2017, it organised a 
workshop on zero-day vulnerabilities with representatives from academia, 
industry and government. The main conclusions were: 
1) Research should be the main driver for discovery, 
2) An EU-wide independent third party should act as coordinator and 
                                                        
8  Ross Anderson, “Disclosing Vulnerabilities and Breaches in the Internet of Things”, 
Presentation at the first meeting of the CEPS Task Force on SW Vulnerability Disclosure in 
Europe, 27 September 2017, Brussels (https://www.ceps.eu/sites/default/files/Ross%20 
Anderson%2C%20Cambridge.pdf). 
9 E. Leverett, R. Clayton and R. Anderson (2017), “Standardization and Certification of the 
‘Internet of Things’”, mimeo, May 2017. 
10 ENISA, “Good Practice Guide on Vulnerability Disclosure”, 18 January 2016. 
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3) A pilot EU vulnerability management centre should serve as a test-bed 
platform for responsible and coordinated vulnerability disclosure.11 
The joint Communication from the European Commission and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on 
“Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU” 
to the European Parliament and the Council of September 2017, referred to the 
“important role of third party security researchers in discovering vulnerabilities 
in existing products and services need to be acknowledged and conditions to 
enable coordinated vulnerability disclosure should be created across Member 
States, building on best practices and relevant standards”.12 
Some governments, such as the Netherlands, have been quite active in this 
area and, together with the private sector and the security research community, 
developed as early as 2013 a model of coordinated vulnerability disclosure. 
As this report will show in more detail later, however, only a few countries 
across Europe have managed to put vulnerability disclosure processes in place. 
Therefore, following a workshop on these issues in June 2017,13 CEPS decided 
to launch a Task Force on Software Vulnerability Disclosure in Europe to focus 
on key aspects surrounding the debate on this issue. The Task Force explored 
ways to formulate guidelines for governments and businesses to harmonise the 
process of handling SVD. The Task Force aimed to outline specific principles 
and formulate policy recommendations for member states and the EU 
institutions in the development of an effective policy framework for introducing 
a process of so-called coordinated vulnerability disclosure in Europe. 
  
                                                        
11  Ignacio Sanchez and Laurent Beslay (2017), “EU zero-day vulnerability management”, 
presentation at the CEPS Workshop on SW Vulnerability Disclosure: The European 
Landscape, 23 June 2017, Brussels (https://www.ceps.eu/sites/default/files/JRC_ 
presentation_ceps_final%20%28Sanchez%29).  
12  European Commission, Joint Communication from the European Commission and the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on “Resilience, 
Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU”, 13 September 2017, p. 6. 
13  See report of the event from 23 June 2017 (https://www.ceps.eu/events/software-
vulnerabilities-disclosure-european-landscape). 
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1.2. Some definitions 
Before moving forward, let’s start with some definitions. 
What is a vulnerability? 
“A vulnerability is a set of conditions or behaviours that allows the violation of 
an explicit or implicit security policy. Vulnerabilities can be caused by software 
defects, configuration or design decisions, unexpected interactions between 
systems or environmental changes. Successful exploitation of a vulnerability has 
technical and risk impacts. Vulnerabilities can arise in information processing 
systems as early as the design phase and as late as system deployment.“14 
Definitions of an exploit, malware, an incident, a patch and zero-day 
vulnerability 
An exploit is a software programme that uses a vulnerability to generate some 
effect. Malware is software programme used to compromise the security of a 
system. An incident is a “violation or an attempted violation of a security policy 
and may involve malware, exploits or vulnerabilities”.15 A patch is a piece of 
software designed to update a computer programme or its supporting data, to 
fix or improve it. This includes fixing security vulnerabilities and other bugs.16 
A zero-day vulnerability, also known as a computer zero day, is a flaw in software, 
hardware or firmware that is unknown to the party or parties responsible for 
patching or otherwise fixing the flaw.17  
1.3. What is vulnerability disclosure? 
As defined in ISO/IEC 29147: 
Vulnerability disclosure is a process through which vendors and 
vulnerability finders may work cooperatively in finding solutions that reduce 
the risks associated with a vulnerability.  
                                                        
14 See “The CERT Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure”, by Allen D. Householder, 
Garret Wassermann, Art Manion and Chris King, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie 
Mellon University, August 2017, p. 2. This part of this report draws from this source. 
15 Ibid., p. 2. 
16 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patch_(computing). 
17 http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/zero-day-vulnerability. 
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It encompasses actions such as reporting, coordinating and publishing 
information about a vulnerability and its resolution. 
The goals of vulnerabilities disclosure include: i) ensuring that identified 
vulnerabilities are addressed, ii) minimising the risk from vulnerabilities and iii) 
providing users with sufficient information to evaluate risks from vulnerabilities 
to their systems.18  
It is important to emphasise that vulnerability disclosure is a process and 
not an event!19 It starts with an awareness of the vulnerability and continues 
with asking (at a minimum) the following two questions: 
1. Now that I am aware of this vulnerability, what should I do in response? 
2. Who else needs to know, what and when? 
The vulnerability disclosure process ends only when these two sets of questions 
are completely answered. 
This process is delimited by two extreme approaches:  
1. Full disclosure: Public release of all details of the vulnerability, often 
without any mitigation measures to protect users. 
2. No disclosure: Nothing is disclosed, i.e. a researcher may be discouraged 
from disclosure, as a way for governments or vendors to acquire 
vulnerabilities for exploitation or advantage at a later stage. 
Research shows that neither of these approaches socially optimal. Instead, there 
are two other modalities of disclosure that give better results. They fall in the 
middle of the two extremes cases above and are called “responsible disclosure” 
and “coordinated vulnerability disclosure” or CVD. Since what constitutes 
responsible behaviour is a matter of opinion, however, the use of the term CVD 
helps to reduce misunderstandings and promotes cooperation. Indeed, both 
responsible disclosure and coordinated vulnerability disclosure aim at sharing 
information on vulnerabilities with vendors, but they differ on the degree of the 
coordination process to protect users.  
1.4. Coordinated vulnerability disclosure 
Coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) is a process aimed at 
mitigating/eradicating the potential negative impacts of vulnerabilities. It can 
be defined as “the process of gathering information from vulnerability finders, 
                                                        
18 ISO/IEC, “ISO/IEC 29147:2014 Information technology-Security techniques-Vulnerability 
disclosure”, 2014. 
19 CERT Guide, op. cit., p. 2.  
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coordinating the sharing of that information between relevant stakeholders, and 
disclosing the existence of vulnerabilities and their mitigation to various 
stakeholders, including the public”.20 Input into this process includes reports 
from vulnerability discovery practices, and its output takes the form of patches, 
vulnerabilities report and database records. Other operational vulnerabilities, 
such as router misconfigurations, website vulnerabilities and cloud problems, 
can be fixed directly by the operator and quite often do not require a public 
disclosure. 
1.5. Actors in CVD 
Let’s begin by examining the CVD process in more detail, starting from the 
various actors that play a role in this process. The CERT Guide21 identifies five 
major actors: 
 Finder (discoverer) – the person or organisation that identifies the 
vulnerability 
 Reporter – the person or organisation that communicates the vulnerability 
to the vendor22 
 Vendor – the person or organisation that created or manages the product 
that is vulnerable 
 Deployer – the person or the organisation that has to deploy the patch or 
take other remediation actions 
 Coordinator – the person or organisation that facilitates the coordinated 
disclosure process 
Figure 1 diagrams the relationships among these various actors. Very often 
persons and organisations play multiple roles: a cloud provider can act as 
vendor and deployer, a researcher can be both finder and reporter and a vendor 
may also be deployer and coordinator, especially in cases where an official 
coordinator, i.e. a CERT, does not exist. 
                                                        
20 “CERT Guide”, op. cit., p. 3. 
21 Ibid., p. 15.  
22 This role often overlaps with other roles and ideally should always be the finder or the 
coordinator. 
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Figure 1. Relationships among actors in the CVD process 
 
Source: Allen D. Householder, Garret Wassermann, Art Manion and Chris King, “The CERT 
Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure”, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie 
Mellon University, August 2017. 
1.6. Phases of CVD 
Starting from the standards specified in ISO/IEC 30111 and considering various 
models of CVD, it is possible to identify the following phases of the CVD 
process:23 
 Discovery – One or more security researchers uncover a vulnerability 
using one of the available methodologies. 
 Reporting – A security researcher presents a vulnerability report to a 
software or product vendor or, if necessary, to a third-party coordinator. 
 Validation and triage – In this phase the report is validated by analysts to 
guarantee accuracy before any practical action is taken in terms of timing 
and modality of response. 
 Remediation – A remediation plan (such as a software patch) is developed 
and tested. 
 Public awareness – The vulnerability itself and its patch are disclosed to 
the public. 
 Deployment – The patch is applied to deployed systems. 
                                                        
23 Ibid., p. 29. This Guide also contains a more detailed discussion of the different phases of 
CVD. 
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Table 1 presents a mapping of these various phases and actors involved in 
carrying out CVD. 
Table 1. CVD actors, by phase 
Actors ->  Finder Reporter Vendor Coordinator Deployer 
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fix or 
mitigation 
Source: Adapted from “The CERT Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure”, by Allen D. 
Householder, Garret Wassermann, Art Manion and Chris King, Software Engineering Institute, 
Carnegie Mellon University, August 2017. 
1.6.1. Bug bounty programs 
When it comes to coordination, it is worth mentioning the role that ad-hoc bug 
bounties programs are playing in the process of coordinated vulnerability 
disclosure. Many companies have created their own programs to compensate 
security researchers for their efforts in finding vulnerabilities. For instance, 
Microsoft, Mozilla, Kaspersky Lab and ING run their own bug bounty 
programs. 24 In other cases, these programs are managed by other companies 
that use their own platforms and teams of experts, connect organisations to a 
global crowd of trusted security researchers to identify vulnerabilities. This is 
the case of companies such as BugCrowd or HackerOne. One example is HACK 
THE PENTAGON, a bug bounty programme of the US Department of Defense 
on the Hackerone platform. Bountyfactory.io, ranked in 1st place in crowd 
security in Europe, is a European bug bounty platform facilitating collaboration 
among companies and the largest community of European security experts 
(involving more than 3,700 bug hunters). 
1.7. Special cases of CVD  
1.7.1. Multiparty CVD25 
When there are only two parties involved in the CVD process – the finder of the 
vulnerability and the vendor that will fix the vulnerability – things are more 
manageable overall and it is easier to create the right communication and trust 
between the two parties. When the CVD involves more than two actors, 
however, as in the recent case of Spectre and Meltdown where a variety of 
companies – Intel, AMD, ARM, Google, Microsoft, Apple, Oracle, Amazon and 
others – scrambled to send out software changes to protect against the hardware 
flaws, it becomes more complex due to the need to synchronise the 
                                                        
24  A list of European companies running Bug Bounties programs can be found at: 
https://bountyfactory.io/programs 
25 See CERT Guide (2017), op. cit., pp. 45-47. 
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development, testing and release process of the different organisations. The 
Vulnerability Coordination Group of the Forum of Incident Response and 
Security Teams (FIRST) has also published an ad-hoc report on this issue: 
“Guidelines and Practices for Multi-Party Vulnerability Coordination and 
Disclosure”. 26 
Following the suggestions from the CERT Guide to CVD, we will now 
discuss in more detail some of the issues related to multiparty CVD.  
Independent rediscovery 
It sometimes happens that the same vulnerability is independently discovered 
by two or more individuals. This process is called “vulnerability rediscovery”. 
Different views exist on the frequency of this phenomenon. For example, for a 
given stockpile of zero-day vulnerabilities, Lillian Ablon and Andy Bogart from 
the Rand Corporation estimated that after a year approximately 5.7% have been 
rediscovered by others.27 Trey Herr, Bruce Schneier and Christopher Morris of 
the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School, however, show that 
rediscovery takes place even more often than previously estimated. Indeed, they 
report that 15-20% of vulnerabilities are discovered independently at least twice 
within a year. In particular, for the Android operating system, 13.9% of 
vulnerabilities are rediscovered within 60 days, increasing to 20% within 90 days 
and above 21% within 120 days. And for the Chrome browser, they found 
12.57% rediscovery within 60 days. The researchers conclude that “the 
information security community needs to map the impact of rediscovery on the 
efficacy of bug bounty programs and policymakers should more rigorously 
evaluate the costs of non-disclosure of software vulnerabilities”.28  
Complicated supply chains 
Already today, and especially with the development of the IoT, many products 
are or will be developed by more than a single organisation. This is also the case 
of software libraries licensed for inclusion in other products. When a 
vulnerability is discovered in one part of a library, it is clear that not only the 
originating vendor of that part will be involved in the disclosure but also all the 
downstream vendors that use that library. There are vertical and horizontal 
                                                        
26  See FIRST (https://first.org/global/sigs/vulnerability-coordination/multiparty/ 
guidelines-v1.0), July 2017.  
27 Lillian Ablon and Andy Bogart, Zero Days, Thousands of Nights – The Life and Times of Zero-
Days Vulnerabilities and Their Exploits, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2017, p. xii. 
28 Trey Herr, Bruce Schneier and Christopher Morris, “Taking Stock: Estimating Vulnerability 
Rediscovery”, Working Paper, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, July 
2017, p. 1. 
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supply chains. In a vertical supply chain, multiple products all share 
dependency on a vulnerable library or component. When the patch is developed 
for a given component, it can be used for all products. In a horizontal supply 
chain, multiple products implement the same vulnerability (from 
underspecified protocols or design flaws). Therefore, each vendor must develop 
patches for their own implementation of the vulnerability. The management of 
the latter is more complicated. 
Response pacing, synchronisation and communication 
It may occur that the various parties respond to a discovery at different paces. 
The originating vendor is interested in disclosing as soon as the patch is ready, 
putting the downstream users at risk. At the same time, some vendors would 
like to release the patch sooner than others. All these coordination problems 
require better communication among the various parties. In this case, it could be 
very helpful to put all parties in contact with one another directly through the 
use of conference calls, group meetings and a private mailing list, instead of 
having a coordinator.  
1.7.2. Forever day vulnerabilities 
To complete the analysis, it is worth mentioning the special case in which it may 
be impossible to mitigate or patch a discovered vulnerability. This is the case 
when the vulnerability is discovered in legacy products nearing the end of their 
life cycle. In this case, vendors do not patch the vulnerabilities but simply advise 
the user on how to work around the threat.29 
1.8. Future issues in CVD 
The most important issues for the future development of CVD are related to the 
diffusion of the Internet of Things. The diffusion of ‘smart things’ will soon 
outnumber computers and in the near future, mobile phones as well. Their 
vulnerabilities may be remotely exploited, posing great security risks to 
society.30 Furthermore, many companies today producing ‘smart things’ do not 
                                                        
29  Dan Goodin, “Rise of ‘forever day’ bugs in industrial systems threatens critical 
infrastructure – When Microsoft, Adobe, and Apple learn of critical flaws in their products 
…”, Ars Technica, 10 April 2012 (https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/ 
04/rise-of-ics-forever-day-vulnerabiliities-threaten-critical-infrastructure/). 
30 The case in point here is the 2016 Dyn Cyberattack that took place 21 October 2016, and 
involved multiple distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS attacks) targeting systems 
operated by Domain Name System (DNS) provider Dyn, which caused major internet 
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specialise in security, so we can expect a steep learning curve for them, code re-
use across products and the need to acquire external expertise in security.  
This prospect presents engineers, researchers and regulators with numerous 
new challenges, such as embedding security and safety into technical standards, 
e.g. based on security-by-design and security-by-default principles. However, 
ensuring sustainability in software and in the supporting tool-chains is proving 
to be more challenging than one might expect: How does one write code for 
which security patches must be made available for the next 30 years?  
 
                                                        
platforms and services to be unavailable to large swathes of users in Europe and North 
America. Dyn disclosed that, according to business risk intelligence firm FlashPoint and 
Akamai Technologies, the attack was a botnet coordinated through a large number of Internet 
of Things-enabled (IoT) devices, including cameras, residential gateways, and baby monitors, 
that had been infected with Mirai malware (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_ 
Dyn_cyberattack). 
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3. STATE OF PLAY IN CVD 
BY COUNTRY 
3.1. CVD within member states 
An important focus of this Task Force has been to conduct a survey of the 
progress made by EU member states in implementing a national CVD policy. 
The Netherlands has led the EU’s efforts in establishing CVD policies and has 
heavily contributed to supporting other member states in their efforts to address 
their own challenges and concerns. The country has a proper legal framework 
in place, as well clear procedures for reporting vulnerabilities that include the 
protection of the researcher. France has recently put together a clear and 
effective legislative framework and incorporated CVD in their Law for a Digital 
Republic (Art. 47). According to recent reports, Lithuania also deserves to 
receive special mention: a vulnerability disclosure framework for a specific 
sector (“providers of public communications networks”) is in place, which 
includes a disclosure deadline, scheduled resolution and an acknowledgement 
report. Organizations have established processes to receive and disseminate 
vulnerability information. 
As can be seen in the list below and in Figure 2, many countries plan to 
implement such a policy but haven’t yet reached a consensus at the political or 
legislative level. This is the status, for instance, in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Romania, Slovenia and the United Kingdom. More details on these and other 
countries’ progress are given below. 
Austria 
Austria hasn’t yet implemented a CVD policy. CERT.at members have sent some 
proposals for introducing a CVD policy to those responsible for transposing the 
Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive) into 
national law. According to these members, however, implementing a specific 
CVD policy is not needed as existing law already allows for disclosure.  
Belgium 
Belgium hasn’t implemented a CVD policy, but it plans to do so. Based on the 
Task Force’s independent and preliminary research, the Belgian Parliament 
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intends to create room in its legal framework to allow for ethical hacking,31 
although it is currently focusing its attention on implementing the NIS Directive 
first. A representative of the Center for Cyber Security Belgium told the Task 
Force that it has made a proposal and is currently waiting for comments from 
the Cybercrime group of the Ministry of Justice and the Government’s approval. 
Bulgaria 
Bulgaria hasn’t yet implemented a CVD policy and there is no plan to implement 
one at this stage. Recognising the importance of a developing a well-defined and 
speedy process of vulnerability detection, mitigation and correction, CERT 
Bulgaria is hopeful that discussions on this issue will start as soon as possible. 
Croatia 
Croatia has not provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy in place or under 
consideration at this time. 
Cyprus 
Cyprus hasn’t provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy in place or under 
consideration at this time. 
Czech Republic 
Czech Republic does not have a CVD policy at the national level and there are 
no current discussions at the present time. On the other hand, their national 
Government CERT (NCKB, NUKIB) sees CVD as a topic it needs to catch up 
with and would like to start a discussion at the national level in the course of 
2018.  
Denmark 
Denmark hasn’t provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy in place at this 
time. 
                                                        
31 See https://cert.lv/uploads/pasakumi/Nathalie_Falot.pdf. 
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Estonia 
Estonia hasn’t provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy in place at this 
time. 
Finland 
In 2010, the National Cyber Security Center Finland (NCSC-FI) published a 
Vulnerability Coordination Policy. Such policy (updated in 06/2012) is an 
ongoing effort to spell out their position and to initiate discussion on the topic. 
NCSC-FI promotes responsible handling of vulnerability information during all 
stages of the vulnerability lifecycle, and not merely during the disclosure phrase. 
There are no ongoing discussions. 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Regarding CVD policy, the national CSIRT of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) has a general policy on information disclosure, which is 
publicly available on its website, but only in the local Macedonian language. 
They are in the process of drafting a more specialised CVD policy for reporting 
vulnerabilities in its systems and services as well as in third-party systems, 
which is expected to be published by the end of Q2 2018. 
France 
France has established a CVD policy. In the event that a researcher reports a 
suspected vulnerability to ANSSI (Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes 
d'information, the country’s service created in 2009 with responsibility for 
computer security), Art. 47 of the Law for a Digital Republic supersedes Art. 
40. 32  Art. 47 exempts the researcher (“goodwill person”) who reports the 
                                                        
32 Art. 47 reads: «Art. L. 2321-4.-Pour les besoins de la sécurité des systèmes d'information, 
l'obligation prévue à l'article 40 du code de procédure pénale n'est pas applicable à l'égard 
d'une personne de bonne foi qui transmet à la seule autorité nationale de sécurité des systèmes 
d'information une information sur l'existence d'une vulnérabilité concernant la sécurité d'un 
système de traitement automatisé de données.»  
«L'autorité préserve la confidentialité de l'identité de la personne à l'origine de la transmission 
ainsi que des conditions dans lesquelles celle-ci a été effectuée.»  
«L'autorité peut procéder aux opérations techniques strictement nécessaires à la 
caractérisation du risque ou de la menace mentionnés au premier alinéa du présent article aux 
fins d'avertir l'hébergeur, l'opérateur ou le responsable du système d'information.» 
And Art. 40 reads: “Toute autorité constituée, tout officier public ou fonctionnaire qui, dans 
l'exercice de ses fonctions, acquiert la connaissance d'un crime ou d'un délit est tenu d'en 
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vulnerability from the provisions contained in Art. 40. The Agency also 
undertakes to protect the confidentiality of the identity of the researcher who 
reports the vulnerability.  
Germany 
Germany’s Federal Agency for Information Security (BSI) has a clear mandate 
for IT network security and by extension for the security of IT products. As a 
part of BSI, the national CERT section CERT-Bund protects German stakeholders 
by reporting vulnerabilities and coordinating their disclosure. A CVD policy is 
still a work in progress, with implementation planned for later this year (2018). 
Greece 
The Task Force has not received an official response from Greece concerning its 
efforts in this area. Based on our independent and preliminary research, there is 
no CVD policy in place at this time. 
Hungary 
Hungary hasn’t implemented a CVD policy. The country’s representatives 
expressed interest in doing so at the Expert Meeting on Responsible Disclosure” 
of the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE) in March 2016, but there have 
been no further updates since.  
Ireland 
Ireland hasn’t provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy in place at this 
time. 
Italy 
The Digital Transformation Team has started to draft a CVD policy that aims to 
be generic and potentially will cover both the private and public sectors. The 
work is being carried out in collaboration with the two national CERTs. There 
are ongoing discussions on how to harmonise CVD, given the national laws 
regulating computer crime and (unauthorised) access as well on the legal aspects 
such as the legal protection of the researcher. A pilot programme aimed at 
supporting private companies in implementing CVD policies and improving 
internal/external processes has been prepared, but it is currently on hold 
pending the resolution of certain legal questions.  
                                                        
donner avis sans délai au procureur de la République et de transmettre à ce magistrat tous les 
renseignements, procès-verbaux et actes qui y sont relatifs.” 
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Latvia 
Latvia has been very active in European discussions on Responsible Disclosure 
Policy (RDP), including the GFCE RDP forum. This report devotes an entire 
chapter to their experience. 
Lithuania 
A report33 facilitated by the Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC) at 
the University of Oxford and released in November 2017 observes that 
“Lithuania has reached a strategic stage in national capacity to design a cyber 
resilience strategy and lead its implementation as well as in the existence of 
reliable Internet services and infrastructure”.  
Based on our discussions with experts at GCSCC who worked on this 
report, Lithuania is still in the process of developing its own Cybersecurity 
Strategy, which is likely to incorporate CVD within the strategy. The final 
discussion and its submission to a final vote is planned for the summer of 2018.  
They’ve also reported that the following steps have been taken in 
Lithuania: 
According to the Order on the Approval of the Rules on the Insurance 
of Security and Integrity of Public Communications Networks and 
Public Electronic Communications Services in Lithuania, providers of 
public communications networks will report certain types of security 
incidents and they must inform the Authority within one working day. 
The National Cyber Security Center is responsible for collecting all 
incident disclosures and notifications when it comes to CI (Critical 
infrastructure) assets. Also another important point is the role of CERT-
LT, in reporting to other authorities as required. Regarding national 
level issues, CERT-LT reports to the Government; on security issues 
related to the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), CERT-LT reports 
directly to the MoND; on personal data protection issues, to the State 
Data Protection Inspectorate; and on suspected criminal activity, to the 
Lithuanian Cyber-Police. Overall, it seems that different procedures are 
in place in different communities. 
A vulnerability disclosure framework for the public 
communications networks is in place, which includes a disclosure 
deadline, scheduled resolution and an acknowledgement report. 
Organisations have established procedures for receiving and 
disseminating vulnerability information.” 
                                                        
33  See https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/content/lithuania-cybersecurity-
capacity-review-2017.  
18 | STATE OF PLAY IN CVD BY COUNTRY 
Luxembourg 
Luxembourg has not implemented a CVD policy. GOVCERT mentioned that 
they are having discussions about the CVD topic at the highest possible level, 
the Cyber Security Board, chaired by their Prime Minister. The setting up of a 
national CVD plan will probably be covered by the third revision of the national 
strategy on cyber-security (currently being written and to be published in Q2 
2018). All the actors involved agreed that Luxembourg needs a CVD strategy on 
a national level.  
For the private sector, CIRCL (Computer Incident Response Center 
Luxembourg) has mentioned that there already are security vulnerability 
disclosure procedures in place for the private sector (see https://www.circl.lu/ 
pub/responsible-vulnerability-disclosure/). 
CIRCL reports that it already has a good basis for the generic guidelines 
for its cyber security strategy.  
Malta 
Based on our independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy 
operating in the country at this time. 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands has implemented a CVD policy. The Dutch experiences with 
coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies have been very positive. Many 
organisations in the Netherlands have actively adopted coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure and have been satisfied with the results. There’s a 
dedicated chapter in this report regarding their experience. 
Poland 
Poland has not provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy in place at the 
time of writing. 
Portugal 
Portugal hasn’t provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy at this time. 
Romania 
CERT.ro publishes a CVD policy on its website, although it clearly states that 
“CERT-RO must answer successfully to this challenge even in the absence of a 
proper legislation regarding disclosure of vulnerabilities, through implementing 
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Coordinated Vulnerabilities Disclosure mechanisms (CVD)”. Companies and 
institutions are strongly encouraged at national level to adopt mechanisms 
enabling the reporting, rapid evaluation and remedy of the vulnerabilities and 
the identification of and adoption of a dedicated legal framework for reporting 
vulnerabilities. 
Slovakia 
Slovakia has not provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy in place in the 
country at this time. 
Slovenia 
Slovenia has not yet implemented a CVD policy. Their national CERT (SI-CERT) 
has proposed to add this topic to the upcoming Law on Information Security, 
but no consensus has reached for such support at this time. Together with the 
Information Commissioner’s Office, SI-CERT intends to continue this debate 
with the representatives of the Ministry of Justice. The challenges they face are 
related to the awareness of decision-makers on the political level concerning 
current best-practices in the Information Security community. 
Spain 
Spain has not provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy in place at this 
time. 
Sweden 
Sweden has not provided the Task Force with an official response. Based on our 
independent and preliminary research, there is no CVD policy in place at this 
time. 
United Kingdom 
The UK government’s pilot project for vulnerability coordination, involving the 
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), is ongoing. It is working with a selected 
group of UK-based security practitioners to help them to identify and resolve 
vulnerabilities across three systems used in the UK public sector. To help them 
get this right, they are working with a private security company for advice and 
intend to use a recognised platform for vulnerability coordination. The pilot is a 
formalisation of previous ad-hoc UK government vulnerability coordination 
efforts, with the goal of designing a mature process to receive, triage and 
remediate ongoing vulnerability disclosures from the security community.  
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Switzerland 
(Neither an EU nor EEA member but part of the single market) 
Switzerland has not yet implemented a CVD policy, but it currently enhancing 
the national strategy for protecting against cyber risks (NCS). During its 
implementation, MELANI (Reporting and Analysis Center for Information 
Assurance) allowed that it might be possible to discuss a CVD policy. 
MELANI/GovCERT has adopted a special approach towards regulating 
vulnerability disclosure in particular by seeking and encouraging responsible 
and voluntary behaviour on the part of all participants based on self-
governance. Regulation by the state should only be used as a last resort. The 
Swiss authorities encourage each participant and vulnerability researcher to 
follow the rules of responsible disclosure. They are coordinating and supporting 
such efforts by mediating between researchers and affected organisations. They 
have done this in the past several times and were mostly successful in striking a 
good balance between protection, timeliness and disclosure.  
MELANI/GovCERT discuss the question of Responsible Disclosure in its 
semi-annual report 2/2015 (see https://www.melani.admin.ch/melani/en/ 
home/dokumentation/reports/situation-reports/semi-annual-report-2015-
2.html). They plan to facilitate the process by establishing a website where 
vulnerabilities can be communicated in case a direct contact to the vendor fails. 
When asked about the major challenges they’re facing, MELANI cited the 
different expectations about timeliness of a reaction between the researchers and 
the manufacturers/vendors. Finding the right security contacts also presented 
challenges, as not all vendors make their security/incident contacts public. 
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Figure 2. CVD policy in Europe: A mapping of the state of play, by country 
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Table 2. Matrix of implementation of CVD policy at national level in Europe 
CVD policy at 
national level Status Country 
YES 
CVD policy established, full protection 
of the researcher Netherlands 
CVD policy established, but partial 
protection of the researcher France 
 
IN PROGRESS 
Implemented CVD policy for a specific 
sector, ongoing discussions and national 
framework expected for summer 2018 
Lithuania 
Ongoing discussions and preliminary 
work done Italy 
See dedicated chapter Latvia 
Ongoing discussions and pilot United Kingdom 




Republic of Macedonia 
Luxembourg 
Slovenia 
Discussions planned for 2018 Germany 
 
NO 
Discussions planned for 2018, although 
there is no legal framework Czech Republic 
Policy released by their CERT, although 
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3.2. Case studies of CVD in selected EU member states 
3.2.1. The Netherlands* 
Introduction 
In 2011, two high-profile incidents involving ICT (Information and 
communications technology) became public: a vulnerability in the Dutch public-
transport chip card and the Diginotar certification authority case. Both cases 
affected large parts of the Dutch infrastructure, initiating political discussions 
on how to prevent these from happening again. One result was that an 
investigation was started on possible guidelines for coordinated vulnerability 
disclosure policies. The Dutch Government’s Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum 
(NCSC) cooperated with major sectors of critical infrastructure, including the 
telecoms and financial sector, to write guidelines for coordinated vulnerability 
disclosure policy, which was published in January 2013. Companies in the 
telecommunications sector started publishing their disclosure policies at the end 
of 2012, with many companies in other sectors following in 2013 and 2014. This 
                                                        
* This section of the report was contributed by Jeroen van der Ham, National Cyber Security 
Centre, The Netherlands. 
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created some security for researchers to perform their security research and to 
disclose their findings to the companies. 
The practice of vulnerability disclosure has proven to have made a 
valuable contribution to digital security in the Netherlands. Both public and 
private parties have received numerous reports of vulnerabilities, which have 
helped these parties to improve the security of their systems. In addition, the 
practice of reporting these vulnerabilities has increased the security awareness 
of companies in the Netherlands. 
The past few years have shown that many security researchers are willing 
to work within the guidelines as published in vulnerability disclosure policies. 
Reports have been submitted to companies directly or indirectly. Daily practice 
shows that benevolent reporters and vulnerable organisations were able to come 
into contact and to exchange information regarding possible vulnerabilities. This 
has made it possible to increase the security of the network and information 
systems of these organisations. 
Implementation guideline 
An important document on coordinated vulnerability disclosure is the 
Guideline for Responsible Disclosure.34 This guideline contains implementation 
advice for organisations, as well as for researchers and disclosers. Below is a 
brief summary of this guideline. 
Guidelines for an organisation 
Coordinated vulnerability disclosure starts with an organisation that owns 
information systems or is the vendor of a product. After all, the owner or vendor 
has the primary responsibility for the information security of the system or 
product. It is up to the organisation to adopt and pursue a responsible disclosure 
policy that can give the organisation an effective approach to resolving 
vulnerability issues. 
By publishing its own coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, the 
organisation makes clear how it intends to handle reports of vulnerabilities. As 
we have seen from a number of parties that have already implemented a policy, 
the following elements can be used (not limited): 
 The organisation drafts a policy for coordinated vulnerability disclosure 
and makes it publicly accessible. 
 The organisation ensures that the threshold for someone wishing to report 
a vulnerability is low. The method can be standardised, for example, by 
                                                        
34 See https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/news/responsible-disclosure-
guideline.html.  
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means of an online form for making reports. The organisation may wish 
to consider whether anonymous reports should be allowed. 
 The organisation makes sure that adequate capacity is available to 
respond to any report received. 
 When an organisation receives a report of a vulnerability, it ensures that 
the report is routed as quickly as possible to the department best able to 
evaluate and act on the report. 
 The organisation sends the discloser a confirmation of receipt of the 
report, preferably digitally signed to emphasise the priority. The 
organisation and the discloser then try to agree on the next steps. 
 During the process, the organisation sends regular updates to the 
discloser, keeping him/her informed on the process and the progress 
made. 
 If the vulnerability is to be made public, the organisation and discloser 
agree on a date for publication. A reasonable response time for software 
vulnerabilities is 60 days. Remedying hardware vulnerabilities, however, 
is often more difficult. A response time of six months for hardware 
vulnerabilities can be considered reasonable under normal circumstances. 
 In consultation with both parties it may be prudent to extend or reduce 
the above periods, depending on the number of systems involved. 
 If a vulnerability is difficult or even impossible to resolve, or if resolving 
the vulnerability will involve high costs, both parties may agree not to 
disclose the vulnerability. 
 The organisation may decide to provide a discloser with credit for the 
report, if the discloser so desires. 
 The organisation may choose to give the discloser some form of 
remuneration for reporting the vulnerability if the discloser followed the 
rules of the responsible disclosure policy. The amount of the reward may 
be based on the quality of the disclosure. 
 In consultation with the discloser, the organisation may decide to inform 
the broader ICT community of the vulnerability if it is likely that the 
vulnerability occurs elsewhere.  
 In the coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, the organisation will 
express its position on declining to take legal action if the discloser acts in 
accordance with the policy. 
Guidelines for the discloser 
The discloser in some way observes a vulnerability and wants to contribute to 
the security of the information system by revealing the vulnerability to the 
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respective organisation. In doing so, the discloser recognises that they have a 
social responsibility to disclose vulnerabilities in a coordinated fashion. The 
following elements can be used in order to set the minimum guidelines for the 
discloser:  
 The discloser is responsible for his/her own actions and should act in a 
way that is proportionate to prove that a vulnerability exists. 
 The discloser should report the vulnerability as quickly as is reasonably 
possible, to minimise the risk of hostile actors finding it and taking 
advantage of it. 
 However, the discloser should do so in a confidential manner so that 
others will not gain access to the information. 
 The discloser should not set restrictions on providing information 
regarding a vulnerability. The initiative for giving a reward should be 
with the receiving organisation, which can set guidelines in its published 
policy. 
 The discloser and receiving organisation will make clear arrangements on 
publishing details on the vulnerability. If multiple organisations are 
involved, this should only happen when all organisations are in 
agreement. It is advisable to discuss the public disclosure at an early stage. 
 The discloser and the organisation can make arrangements for informing 
the broader ICT-community of the vulnerability. This may be the right 
choice if the vulnerability is newly detected and it is evident that it may 
be present in other systems or at other organisations. In the Netherlands, 
the NCSC can provide assistance for coordination in these cases.  
The national CERT 
Principally, coordinated vulnerability disclosure is a matter between an 
organisation and a discloser. Nonetheless, in the Netherlands one of the tasks of 
the national CERT, the NCSC, is to promote the implementation of coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure policies within organisations. Furthermore, if necessary, 
the NCSC can pass on information on technical vulnerabilities towards the 
larger ICT community. This will always be done in close consultation with the 
respective organisation and discloser. The NCSC can publicly disclose a 
description of the vulnerability, write or update a fact sheet or white paper, or 
inform organisations in a coordinated manner.  
The NCSC can also act as a mediator. In any situation in which a report is 
made to the NCSC, the NCSC will attempt to put the discloser or potential 
discloser into contact with the affected organisation. As mentioned above, the 
NCSC also coordinates vulnerability disclosure for vulnerabilities that affect 
governmental organisations or organisations of critical infrastructure. 
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Responsible Disclosure and prosecution 
In March 2013, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (PPS) published a 
framework for dealing with disclosers, or ethical hackers who engage in 
responsible disclosure. In general, there is no mention of ‘ethical’ hacking in 
Dutch law on cybercrime. Nor does the law provide for a specific ground for 
exemption from criminal liability for a discloser acting out of ideological or 
ethical motives. Although the law does not provide for it, this does not mean 
that ‘ethical’ motives cannot play a role in assessing the criminal liability of the 
actions of the offender. 
Principally, no criminal investigation will be instituted in case of legal 
rehabilitation between the discloser and the relevant company. However, if a 
vulnerability is reported and there are indications that the discloser did more 
than what was absolutely necessary to discover the vulnerability, this will need 
to be investigated further. Examples are copying of sensitive personal data or 
installing malware on the system. An assessment framework is provided below. 
This is comparable to the Dutch provision allowing journalists to commit 
criminal offences for the purpose of newsgathering. 
A coordinated vulnerability disclosure guideline defines the preferred 
actions to be taken when a vulnerability is discovered. In itself, the manner in 
which this is discovered does not play a role in responsible disclosure. The 
purpose of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is to contribute to increasing the 
security of IT systems by reporting possible vulnerabilities in a careful manner, 
to prevent or limit any damages as much as possible. 
If the company does not have a coordinated vulnerability disclosure 
policy, then no coordinated vulnerability disclosure will exist. When assessing 
these cases, it is, of course possible to look at the general principles used for 
coordinated vulnerability disclosure as described in the general disclosure 
guideline. Further criminal investigation is often needed in order to assess 
whether the actions taken by a discloser were necessary and proportional under 
the given circumstances. If a discloser directly and safely communicates with the 
owner of the IT system on a discovered vulnerability and no data were deleted 
or manipulated, this could constitute coordinated vulnerability disclosure and 
there will be no reason for (further) criminal investigation or prosecution. If, 
however, data were deleted, manipulated or copied, or disproportionate actions 
were taken by the discloser when gaining access to the IT system, this will not 
constitute coordinated vulnerability disclosure and a further criminal 
investigation and criminal prosecution will be indicated. 
In summary, the public prosecutor will, in assessing proportional and 
necessary conduct of a discloser, have to take the following circumstances into 
account: 
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 Did the suspect break criminal laws in the process of finding and reporting 
the vulnerability? 
 Were the suspect’s actions necessary within a democratic society, i.e. did 
they concern an important general interest? 
 Did the suspect’s conduct involve proportional actions (were the means 
chosen in proportion to the goal to be achieved)? In other words, how did 
the hacker gain access to the IT system? If any disproportional actions 
were carried out for this purpose, e.g. as described in the Guidelines (p. 8 
under 4.2.), this will not constitute ‘ethical’ hacking. 
 Could the discloser have taken other possible actions? In other words, was 
the vulnerability immediately reported to the owner of the IT system or 
did the discloser fail to do so in order to erase his tracks or to manipulate, 
copy or delete data, for example? If any tracks were erased or data 
manipulated, copied or deleted, this will not constitute coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure. 
As stated above, it may still be necessary to institute a criminal investigation first 
and to consider the discloser as a suspect, so that the questions above can be 
answered. In case of any doubt, the public prosecutor handling the case can 
consult the cybercrime officer at his or her public prosecutor’s office or the 
Cybercrime Knowledge and Expertise Center at the National Public Prosecutor’s 
Office. At a minimum, it is recommended that any considerations related to the 
above-mentioned framework should be entered into an official log for the 
purpose of explaining the decision to prosecute at the hearing.  
Adoption 
Many Dutch companies have taken the guidelines to heart and implemented 
coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies. In 2016, some of these companies 
took a step further by signing the Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure 
Manifesto, in which they announce public reporting mechanisms on 
vulnerabilities in their ICT systems and call upon other organisations to do the 
same. 
These efforts have been augmented by the Dutch government, which has 
also created a central point of contact to report vulnerabilities. Anyone who 
finds vulnerabilities in websites and digital infrastructure of the Dutch central 
government can report their findings there. Other governmental entities, such 
as provinces, municipalities, the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration and 
the Dutch Public Prosecution Services, have also created points of contact for 
reporting vulnerabilities. 
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Statistics 
Since the publication of the coordinated vulnerability disclosure guidelines by 
the Dutch government in January 2013, it has not been possible to obtain 
accurate and up-to-date statistics on the number of reports filed because not all 
disclosures go through the NCSC. As mentioned earlier, however, a coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure procedure is principally a matter between an 
organisation and a discloser, and if all goes well, involvement of a third party is 
not necessary. The figure below provides an overview of notifications that the 
Dutch NCSC received. In some cases, these reports concerned vulnerabilities 
found in the NCSC’s own systems. In other cases, the reports concern 
information systems of other government entities or private organisations 
operating critical infrastructures.  
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3.2.2. Latvia* 
Current status of IT security and CVD in Latvia 
As of the end of 2017, Latvia has taken several steps in the area of vulnerability 
disclosure and broader IT security, as follows: 
 Some organisations have published their Responsible Disclosure Policy 
(RDP)/CVD policies, starting with Swedbank (2015), but others have also 
done so, e.g. CERT.LV. 
 There have been many cases of CVD, most of which are coordinated by 
CERT.LV. In 2017, around 50 instances of vulnerabilities affecting Latvian 
websites or nationally developed software were reported. For example: 
o Several vulnerabilities were discovered in Latvian eID software. A 
full-scale CVD process was followed, at the end of which the 
information was published. 
o There have been cases of vulnerabilities found in the Riga city 
transport system, social network and e-banking. In those cases only 
some parts of the process have been implemented and the public 
was not always properly informed. 
 Information technologies security Law has been in place since 2011. This 
law defined all IT security landscape elements, created the CERT.LV 
institution (Latvian national and governmental CSIRT), defined tasks and 
duties for CERT.LV, state institutions, local municipalities, IT critical 
infrastructure and ISPs. The law will be amended soon to implement the 
Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS) and 
include providers of essential services and digital services. 
 The ministry responsible for IT security in Latvia is the Ministry of 
Defence. 
 No particular legislation is in place for CVD. The only attempt to legalise 
CVD occurred in 2016, as described in detail below. 
 Latvia’s national cyber strategy is due to be renewed in 2018; CVD will be 
included in that strategy. 
CVD in legislation 
In 2016, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) proposed to address one problem of the 
RDP (Responsible Disclosure Policy)/CVD process via legislation. In particular, 
the proposal intended to specify the responsible disclosure process in the law on 
                                                        
* This section of the report was contributed by Baiba Kaskina, CERT Latvia and Chair TF-
CSIRT. 
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IT security. And if a researcher/hacker would follow the specified RDP process, 
he would then receive a liability waiver for that particular vulnerability 
disclosure. This proposal attempted to address the problem that a researcher is 
not protected from being sued after s/he discovers the vulnerability and reports 
it to either the particular organisation or to a coordinating entity.  
In Latvia, there is a legal system where only the law is relevant in the court. 
So it was not possible to follow the example of the Netherlands where policy on 
RDP/CVD cases is taken into account by the court. 
A multi stakeholder working group was established to discuss the best 
approach to include RDP in the law. Legal experts, security researchers, cyber 
policy experts, CERT.LV and several other groups and institutions were 
represented in this working group. 
After long discussions, amendments were proposed in two laws: 
1. Criminal law. In the articles related to attacks on automated data systems, 
it was proposed to add that liability is waived in the event that the attacker 
follows the responsible disclosure process (which is defined in the IT 
security law). 
2. IT security law. The RDP process is thoroughly defined, including the 
obligations of researchers, CERT.LV, state institutions, local 
municipalities and critical infrastructure organisations. The RDP process 
would be applicable only to these groups and would exclude the private 
sector (where it would apply only to those entities that are recognised as 
Critical infrastructure providers). 
Proposed approach in the IT security law 
Main principles: 
 Each stage of the RDP process (discovery, reporting, response, disclosure) 
has to be reflected in the law; each process must have a beginning and an 
end. 
 Rules have to be precise and strict. 
 Implementation has to be fair and effective. 
 The RDP applies only to state institutions, local municipalities and CII 
providers. 
 CERT.LV (or MilCERT for military networks) acts as the main 
coordinating entity. 
Process: 
 Independent researcher/hacker is obliged to follow the process if s/he 
wants to receive a waiver for liability. 
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o S/he has to log his/her actions which led to the vulnerability 
disclosure. 
o To find the vulnerability, the researcher can gather only the minimal 
amount of data required for the discovery process (cause minimal 
possible damage). That is, if the vulnerability is found, no further 
probing is allowed. 
o Researcher has to inform CERT.LV (or MilCERT in case of military 
networks) within 5 days since the discovery. 
 CERT.LV in such case: 
o Verifies whether the vulnerability is really there, as claimed. 
o Informs the researcher if the vulnerability is really there (true or 
false) and what will be the next actions. 
o If it is true, then CERT.LV informs the owner of the system 
explaining the problem and requesting it be fixed. 
 Owner of the vulnerable system is obliged to: 
o Fix the vulnerability within 90 days. The term can be extended by 
CERT.LV to 180 days if there are sound reasons. 
o Inform CERT.LV when the system is fixed. 
 After CERT.LV receives information from the owner of the vulnerable 
system, it: 
o Verifies whether the vulnerability is fixed and if it appears not to be 
fixed, the work continues with the system owner. 
o Informs the researcher, if the vulnerability is fixed. 
 After receiving this information, the researcher can publish information 
about the vulnerability. 
If the researcher has followed the above-described process, liability will be 
waived if the system owner at any point sues the researcher in court. 
Issues in incorporating RDP/CVD into law 
Latvia found it very difficult to specify many parts of the RDP in law. The issues 
and questions raised below illustrate some of these difficulties. 
 When does the vulnerability discovery process start? 
o Immediately after discovery or a maximum of 5 days prior to 
submission of the report? 
 How much information would a researcher be allowed to gather during 
this phase? 
o Causing minimal possible damage? 
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o Gather only the minimum amount of data required for discovery 
process 
 Legitimacy of methods and instruments 
 Publishing information about the vulnerability 
o If it is published before the vulnerability is fixed – then the liability 
would not be waived. 
o How does that condition relate to freedom of speech? 
It also should be noted that an obligation to fix a problem within 90-180 days 
works only for locally developed systems or websites. In cases where patching 
depends upon an external vendor, the person in charge of the system can do 
very little to fix the vulnerability, apart from using some mitigation techniques. 
Failure to incorporate RDP/CVD in the law 
The proposed amendments to these two laws (IT Security and Criminal Law) 
went to the cabinet of the Ministers, where they were approved, but objections 
were subsequently raised by the State police. The latter insisted on the creation 
of a register of researchers, which would have eliminated any possibility of 
anonymity, which is an essential feature of any such scheme. After long debates 
in the working group involving all parties, no solution was found, and the 
authors decided to drop the proposed initiative. 
There were other objections to the proposal as well. The general fear was 
that these amendments in the law would enable anonymous hackers to hack 
state systems without the possibility of suing them. This demonstrated a lack of 
understanding about the general principles of the RDP/CVD process and would 
require extensive educational work in all layers. 
The authors of the proposal admitted that its provisions were already very 
complicated and had it been implemented in the law, it would be quite difficult 
for researchers to follow the process. 
Conclusions and the next steps 
The authors of the proposal did not see this experience as a total defeat, but 
rather as a lesson that will be helpful in the next round of implementing CVD in 
the law. It is worth pointing out that the government approved the idea of 
introducing a CVD process into the law in general. The private sector in Latvia 
is also encouraged to have a CVD policy in place to raise awareness and 
understanding at various levels and to gather examples of good practices.  
It is advised to take a different approach in the next iteration of the policy, 
in which CERT.LV is established as the de facto trusted party and made 
responsible for making many of the decisions. Also what constitutes 
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proportional and disproportional activities should be more precisely defined, 
and researchers’ concerns about protecting their anonymity should be 
thoroughly addressed. 
3.3. Case studies of CVD outside the EU 
3.3.1. United States* 
The US technical and security community has been concerned with vulnerability 
disclosure for decades. In 2002, in what was not the first attempt to standardise 
CVD behaviour, an IETF draft standard, prepared by research experts Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IEFT), which develops and promotes voluntary 
Internet standards noted that the issue had been “a divisive topic for years.”35 
Security experts, industry leaders, and policy-makers have sought to balance the 
need to protect users from those who seek to exploit vulnerabilities, the rights 
and roles of security researchers, and those who make and maintain the systems 
that we all use. Fortunately, what was once a contentious area rife with conflict 
has seen an emerging consensus in the US, with government policy and law 
supporting private-sector leadership. While there are no one-size-fits-all 
solutions, there can exist best practices and accepted ways of handling 
vulnerability information.  
Early government response to vulnerabilities: coordination and anti-hacking 
statutes 
The initial approach to protect the public took two forms. First, the software and 
security communities realised that software vulnerabilities required organised 
coordination. Following the infamous Morris Worm that brought down much 
of the Internet in 1988 and demonstrated the risks of vulnerable systems, the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) established the 
Computer Emergency Response Team, now known as CERT Coordination 
Center or CERT/CC. This organisation plays a number of roles in securing the 
internet, including acting as a ‘trusted third party’ that could facilitate 
communication between the then small but burgeoning security research 
community, and the relatively small number of software vendors.  
Early computer exploits in the 1980s also drove the government to punish 
bad actors in the new and poorly-understood domain, in an attempt to 
                                                        
* This section of the report was contributed by Allan Friedman, Director of Cybersecurity 
Initiatives at the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), US 
Department of Commerce. 
35 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-christey-wysopal-vuln-disclosure-00. 
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discourage their activities. The legislature targeted malicious behaviour in the 
US anti-hacking statute, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Passed in 
1986 and amended in 1994 and 1996, the law can apply to anyone who accesses 
a computer without authorisation, with criminal and civil penalties. This law is 
controversial among cyber law scholars, and many early judicial interpretations 
set a very broad scope that would include much potentially beneficial security 
research.36  
Software vendors could also use American copyright law to deter security 
research. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA 1998) was a landmark 
attempt to balance copyright and the free flow of information in the Internet age. 
Section 1201 of this law criminalizes attempts to circumvent access control to a 
copyrighted work, regardless of the intent, although there are now recent 
exemptions to DMCA for security research. Since much software is copyrighted 
under US law, and basic technical protection measures are often included, this 
law has been used to threaten and prosecute hackers who have identified 
vulnerabilities in software. Some of these vulnerabilities were used maliciously 
to the detriment of companies and innocent users, but others may have been 
used more constructively. Both the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and 
DMCA were used to threaten security research, and authorities ultimately had 
to help clarify what they meant. 
Chaos and Contention 
As the security community slowly grew in the early ‘00s, the relationship 
between security researchers and vendors grew worse in the US. While some 
disclosures were successfully coordinated, often with little fanfare, there were 
enough high profile incidents to make trust a real issue. Many remember when 
a major vendor physically cut out pages from the proceedings of a large 
conference, while others had friends or knew people who had been threatened 
with lawsuits or by law enforcement. There was real concern among the security 
community that vendors simply weren’t taking software security as seriously as 
the researchers. For their part, vendors didn’t understand the motives or actions 
of the security research community, and often had real difficulty distinguishing 
between those who were attacking their software for malicious purposes, and 
those who had no ill will. CERT/CC still played an important role in facilitating 
disclosure, but as an intermediary, they were criticised by both sides for being 
overly sympathetic and allied with the other side.  
                                                        
36  For a survey of this, see http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/84-Geo.-
Wash.-L.-Rev.-1644.pdf. 
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Absent clear guidance, some security researchers worked to create their 
own broad policies. NMRC, a hacker collective, established their own policy in 
1999 on disclosure with windows of one week or one month depending on 
severity. 37  A more famous one was posted to the bugtraq mailing list by 
respected hacker Rain Forest Puppy, as a response to complaints that researchers 
never notified vendors or gave them a chance to respond.38 This policy gave a 
two (later five) day window for response from the vendor, demanding regular 
communication but not setting a specific timeline on fixing the vulnerability.  
The underlying debate was between private disclosure and full disclosure. 
The former was criticized as ineffective, while the latter was condemned as 
socially irresponsible. This debate was even picked up by the nascent academic 
research community on the economics of information security, though they also 
failed to find an optimal response.39 One low point in this period of distrust can 
be seen in 2009 by a presentation at the security conference CanSecWest 
proselytising the mantra of “no more free bugs,” arguing that the legal and 
professional risks of working with vendors outweighed the benefits of selling 
them to any paying customer or simply disclosing them publicly.40  
Collaboration and CVD 
By the early 2010s, it was clear by many across the community that the status 
quo was not sustainable. Security researchers were growing in number, and 
wanted a safer ecosystem. Vendors were beginning to appreciate the role of 
external researchers. Cooperation began more explicitly as companies posted 
disclosure policies, and the idea of bug bounties spread from a revolutionary 
concept to an emerging business practice.  
The American government followed suit to help shore up collaboration, 
through a variety of means. An early step was taken in 2013, when the consumer 
protection agency Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against mobile 
device manufacturer HTC for failing to employ “reasonable security.”41 While 
numerous lapses were alleged, the fifth of five charges was the failure “to 
                                                        
37 https://www.nmrc.org/pub/advise/policy.txt. 
38 https://wiretrip.net/rfp/policy.html. 
39 For example, 5 different papers on the economics vulnerability discovery and disclosure 
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implement a process for receiving and addressing security vulnerability reports 
from third-party researchers.”  
As the issue become more common, it became clear that the private sector 
could benefit from clarity. In 2015, the National Telecommunication and 
Information Administration (NTIA) in the US Department of Commerce 
announced that it would convene a multi-stakeholder process “to bring together 
security researchers, software vendors, and those interested in a more secure 
digital ecosystem to create common principles and best practices.” 42  This 
process brought together very diverse view points, while emphasizing that there 
was no one-size-fits-all solution. Participants in this process developed a 
template disclosure policy to make it easier for organizations to begin a CVD 
process, conducted research to understand researcher and vendor motivations 
and concerns, and developed a framework for multiparty disclosure involving 
vulnerabilities that affect multiple vendors.43 
Other government agencies followed in quick order. In 2015, the FTC 
included vulnerability disclosure in the cybersecurity guide for businesses.44 By 
the end of 2016, regulators like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and 
the National Highway Transportation and Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
highlighted CVD as an important part of cybersecurity guidance and best 
practices for medical devices45 and modern vehicles.46 The FDA’s programme is 
particularly noteworthy, as it establishes incentives for medical device 
manufacturers to learn about and deal with vulnerabilities quickly, rather than 
avoid knowing about them.  
Even the often-conservative Department of Defence (DoD) joined the CVD 
throng. In 2016, in addition to their targeted bug bounty programme for the 
Pentagon’s website, the DoD announced a CVD policy for all public-facing 
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systems. Then Secretary of Defence Ash Carter described it in common sense 
terms, as “a ‘see something, say something’ policy for the digital domain”.47 
As CVD practices spread across the American economy, the law had to 
catch up as well. In October of 2015, the United States Copyright Office 
recommended exemptions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) for “good faith security research” on the computer systems that are 
built into voting machines, motorized land vehicles and implantable medical 
devices.48 Researchers looking for vulnerabilities in these categories of systems 
could no longer be targeted for criminal or civil penalties under the DMCA. 
(Vulnerabilities in voting machines have since attracted strong attention in the 
United States.49) The Copyright Office agreed with NTIA that copyright law may 
be a poor vehicle for cybersecurity policy, and many anticipate that further calls 
will be made for the Copyright Office to exempt other categories of systems for 
security research.  
The US anti-hacking law (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act or CFAA) still 
remains in force to protect American computer systems, but the Department of 
Justice has acknowledged the importance of securing the role of security 
research. In 2014, the Department issued guidance for federal prosecutors 
contemplating charges under the CFAA. While there is no carve-out or even any 
explicit reference to security research or disclosure, the guidance lists factors to 
consider to “ensure that charges are brought only in cases that serve a 
substantial federal interest”. The Cybersecurity Unit of DoJ went further in 2017 
by offering a Framework for Vulnerability Disclosure Programs. The goal of this 
guidance was to assist in the development of CVD programs to clarify 
“authorized vulnerability disclosure and discovery conduct, thereby 
substantially reducing the likelihood that such described activities will result in 
a civil or criminal violation of law.”  
One common theme across the different legal and policy approaches to 
CVD is that they acknowledge the inherent diversity in CVD programs, based 
on an organisation’s systems, capacity and preferences. The DoJ guidance makes 
it clear that “different organizations may have differing goals and priorities.” 
CERT/CC still plays a role as a coordinator, but acting as a single neutral party 
hasn’t scaled as the digital world has grown, and they now offer expertise while 
supporting others in their efforts. CERT/CC joined a group of security experts 
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to advocate CVD’s inclusion in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, a key 
security strategy and standards document for the US economy. It is 
acknowledged in the 2017 Draft 2 of the Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1, 
which notes the importance of “processes… established to receive, analyse and 
respond to vulnerabilities disclosed to the organization from internal and 
external sources (e.g. internal testing, security bulletins, or security 
researchers)”.50 
3.3.2. Japan* 
In Japan, the coordinated disclosure of vulnerabilities in products such as 
software is performed in accordance with the "Information Security Early 
Warning Partnership Guideline" (herein "Guideline"). This Guideline is based 
on a 2004 notification from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
entitled "Standards for Handling Software Vulnerability Information and 
Others", which has been amended in 2014 and 2017. The notification was 
renamed "Standards for Handling Vulnerability-related Information of Software 
Products and Others" in 2017. The Guideline was created and jointly announced 
in cooperation with several industry organizations, Japan Electronics and 
Information Technology Industries Association (JEITA), Japan Information 
Technology Service Industry Association (JISA), Computer Software 
Association of Japan (CSAJ), Japan Network Security Association (JNSA). It 
serves as a recommendation to parties relevant to the coordinated vulnerability 
disclosure process. The recommended processes in the Guideline are in 
alignment with ISO/IEC 29147:2014 “Vulnerability disclosure". For the 
purposes of this document, vulnerabilities in products such as software, 
firmware, etc. will be within our scope.  
In this Guideline, vulnerability reports from researchers are sent to the 
Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), a policy implementation 
agency under the jurisdiction of METI for initial analysis and triage. After this 
process, the reports are sent to the JPCERT Coordination Center (JPCERT/CC), 
an independent, non-profit organisation funded by METI for coordination with 
the vendor/developer of the product. Once the vulnerability has been addressed 
by the vendor/ developer, an advisory will be published on Japan Vulnerability 
Notes (JVN), typically in conjunction with an advisory from the 
vendor/developer. Through this coordinated vulnerability disclosure process, a 
total of 1,504 advisories have been published on JVN as of 30 September 2017. 
                                                        
50  https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/12/05/draft-2_framework-
v1-1_without-markup.pdf. 
* This section of the report was contributed by Uchiyama Takayuki, CERT Japan. 
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While this coordinated vulnerability disclosure process has worked fairly 
well over the years, the number of reports received has increased significantly 
over the past few years. Various reasons can be adduced for this increase, among 
them being an increase in overall awareness of security vulnerabilities, an 
increase in the number of researchers searching for vulnerabilities, increase in 
the number of products available, the availability of easy-to-use tools for 
vulnerability discovery, etc. The increase in reports has led to a process overflow 
where some reports are not being handled in a timely manner. Until very 
recently, the Guideline stated that all reported vulnerabilities must be 
coordinated and subsequently disclosed on JVN after the vulnerability has been 
addressed. While it is probably best to coordinate and disclose all reported 
vulnerabilities, regardless of their severity or the number of users that a 
particular product has, this is not practical in practice. Also, since this Guideline 
has been published, many vendors/developers have become receptive to the 
coordinated vulnerability disclosure process, but there still remain many 
vendors/developers that are not. 
As a recommendation for creating a policy on coordinated vulnerability 
disclosure, the experiences in Japan lead to the following considerations: 
- Incentives should be provided to researchers to report vulnerabilities to 
an organisation that can directly address the vulnerability or at the very 
least coordinate with an organisation that can address the vulnerability. 
- Monetary incentives should also be provided (bug bounty). 
- Recognition should also be provided (credit on an advisory). 
- Incentives should be provided to vendors to support the coordinated 
disclosure of vulnerabilities. 
- Vendors should be allowed to promote their own actions to address 
vulnerabilities as a good practice (market appeal). 
- Third-party coordinators can also provide value in this process. 
- Advisories should be published so that information can reach a wider 
audience. 
- Support should be provided in the coordination process where multiple 
organisations need to be contacted with a vulnerability (multi-party 
coordination). 
- Coordination process should be clarified so that researchers know how a 
reported vulnerability will be coordinated and disclosed. 
- Vendors should be educated to create a coordination process so that 
researchers know vendors will address reported vulnerabilities. 
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4. LEGAL CHALLENGES FROM 
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY 
DISCLOSURE IN THE EU* 
4.1. Circumstances in which disclosure of software security 
vulnerability is advantageous 
Past experience shows that software security vulnerability disclosure can indeed 
be a helpful means under specific circumstances for vendors to identify security 
issues in advance and thereby prevent exploitation of these vulnerabilities by 
hackers. If not properly handled, however, disclosure of software security 
vulnerabilities may give a window of opportunity to hackers to exploit the 
identified vulnerabilities before a patch is deployed. Therefore, the appropriate 
legal framework should exist that would allow discovery of software 
vulnerabilities under certain specifically prescribed circumstances, including 
complementary policy guidance for processes of coordinated disclosure of 
vulnerabilities.51 This proposition is supported, among others, by the Council 
itself, which, in its 20 November 2017 Conclusions on the Joint Communication 
to the European Parliament and the Council: Resilience, Deterrence and 
Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU, “welcome[d] the call to 
acknowledge the important role of third party security researchers in 
discovering vulnerabilities in existing products and services and call[ed] upon 
Member States to share best practices for coordinated vulnerability 
disclosure.”52  
Finally, policy-makers need to consider and address important questions 
when deciding on the changes required to the legal or policy framework to allow 
                                                        
* This chapter of the report was contributed by Andriani Ferti, Senior Associate, Karatzas & 
Partners law firm. 
51 ENISA has been the first to acknowledge the need for a clear legal framework allowing 
vulnerability reporting in the circumstances where it can be helpful to manufacturers to 
prevent widespread cybersecurity attacks. Indeed, in its Good Practice Guide on Vulnerability 
Disclosure, it stressed that “[o]ne of the primary challenges […] is the need for an advanced 
legal landscape to ensure that vulnerability reporting is not endangered by the unintended 
consequences of criminal and civil legislation” (p. 70). 
52  Council Conclusions on the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council, Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU – 
Council conclusions (20 November 2017), Conclusion No. 27. 
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for coordinated vulnerability disclosure. Such questions involve defining at 
which point in time the disclosure should happen, what information should be 
disclosed, in what format and to whom this information should be disclosed. 
These questions arise especially in view of the number of stakeholders involved 
in this complex process, including the software vendors, independent 
researchers, governments and actual users, but also the general public. 
4.2. Legal challenges in relation to software vulnerability 
disclosure and the relevant legislative framework  
As acknowledged in the Good Practice Guide on Vulnerability Disclosure of 
ENISA, there are numerous pressing legal challenges associated with the 
vulnerability disclosure process as “[i]ndividuals who discover a vulnerability 
often face legal threats when they decide to report it. These threats can have 
implications on not only civil and criminal law, but also contract law, licensing, 
patent law and other types of legislation.”53 
This section sets out the legal issues that arise in the context of software 
security vulnerability disclosure. These issues cover (as also acknowledged in 
the ENISA Practice Guide) various areas of law ranging from industrial and 
intellectual property (including copyright, trade secrets, patents and trademark 
law) to export control regulation and data protection law, as well as criminal 
law.  
4.3. Criminal law 
There are two questions when looking into security research for software 
vulnerabilities which refers to the process of finding vulnerabilities as opposed 
to reporting them, from a criminal law perspective. The first one is a substantive 
one and concerns the circumstances under which finding vulnerabilities may be 
associated with a criminal offence, that of illegal access to an information system. 
The second one is a procedural one and relates to the conditions that need to be 
met for any crimes associated with finding vulnerabilities to be prosecuted.  
The relevant legislative instruments in the EU are: i) the 2001 Council of 
Europe Convention on cybercrime (Cybercrime Convention), ii) Directive 
2013/40/EU of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and 
replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA (the Cybercrime 
Directive) and iii) any relevant national legislation in Member States across EU 
                                                        
53  ENISA, “Good Practice Guide on Vulnerability Disclosure – From challenges to 
recommendations”, January 2016, p. 7. 
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(including the national legislation transposing the Cybercrime Directive), and in 
particular the provisions concerning illegal access to information systems.  
Article 2 of the Cybercrime Convention provides what constitutes illegal 
access to an information system and stipulates: “[e]ach Party shall adopt such 
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the access to the 
whole or any part of a computer system without right.” That means that four 
conditions need to be met for illegal access to apply under the Cybercrime 
Convention: i) the person should have accessed the system intentionally, ii) that 
person should have actually had access to the computer system, iii) that access 
should concern either the whole or part of the computer system and iv) that 
person should have no right to access the system. The Convention allows 
countries that are signatory parties to it to require that the offence be committed 
by infringing security measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or 
other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to 
another computer system. 
The Cybercrime Directive very much reflects the Cybercrime Convention 
in relation to what constitutes illegal access to an information system. In 
particular, in its Article 3 the Directive provides that Member States are required 
to adopt legislative measures “to ensure that, when committed intentionally, the 
access without right, to the whole or to any part of an information system, is 
punishable as a criminal offence where committed by infringing a security 
measure, at least for cases which are not minor”. The Directive sets minimum 
protection to be afforded by Member States (i.e. Member States can introduce 
stricter requirements). In light of this, under the Cybercrime Directive, there are 
five conditions that need to be met: i) the person should have accessed the 
system intentionally, ii) he should have actually accessed the information 
system, iii) in whole or in part, iv) without any right, and v) he should have 
accessed the system (at least in major cases) by infringing a security measure.  
Nonetheless, as can be understood from the above, especially given that 
the Directive affords only a minimum level of protection, Member States have 
adopted varying interpretations of what constitutes illegal access (i.e. hacking), 
and which varies significantly. For example, in the Netherlands, illegal access 
would be considered purposefully and unlawfully entering an automated 
system by breaching security measures (e.g. by means of technical interference, 
false signals/false keys, or assuming a false identity). In a similar vein, the Greek 
definition of illegal access reflects the Cybercrime Directive. On the other hand, 
in Belgium, hacking/illegal access is interpreted broadly, and there is no need 
to show that security measures have been breached, or that the person has 
accessed the software system without the right to do so. The case is similar in 
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Germany, where there is neither a need to show that security measures have 
been breached nor to show unlawfulness.  
Having examined what constitutes illegal access, it is key to understand 
the notion of ethical hacking, because it is central to security research for 
software vulnerabilities. Whereas CVD is about how software vulnerabilities are 
reported, how vendors respond and how disclosure is coordinated, in essence, 
security research can be the result of ethical hacking as the latter refers to the act 
of identifying weaknesses and vulnerabilities of information systems by 
duplicating the intent and actions of malicious hackers. Nonetheless, even 
though ethical hacking is also cited by the policy documents in place in countries 
where a robust legal/policy framework has been set for vulnerability disclosure, 
such as Netherlands, the notion does not exist as such in criminal law. This is 
explicitly confirmed in the letter sent by the Dutch Public Prosecutor to all its 
departments in relation to vulnerability disclosure.  
But how did the Dutch Prosecutor ensure therefore that security research 
is in compliance with criminal law in view of the absence of the notion of ethical 
hacking in the law? To that effect the Dutch prosecutor provided for three 
principles in accordance with which one can establish the lawfulness of the 
relevant acts. These three principles relate namely to: i) the motives of the 
researcher, ii) subsidiarity and iii) proportionality. First, the relevant department 
would need to examine the motives of the researchers and whether or not these 
are ethical. Second, the actions of the researcher after he discovers a vulnerability 
will be considered. For example, in any legal analysis, it should be considered 
whether the researcher disclosed the vulnerability once he discovered it. Finally, 
if the researcher – either intentionally or unintentionally – ends up doing more 
(such as copying sensitive data or personally identifying information) than 
merely accessing the system, and discovering the vulnerability, the prosecutor 
will probably launch a criminal investigation.  
The question therefore arises whether the Dutch Prosecutor’s reasoning in 
relation to vulnerability disclosure could also be implemented in other member 
states. The brief answer is that in view of the divergent transposition of Article 
3 of the Cybercrime Directive and the fact that the requirements to show illegal 
access vary across the 28 different jurisdictions, the Dutch example cannot 
necessarily be implemented in other member states as such. In particular, 
unlawfulness is a key element to show illegal access in the Netherlands, and it 
is the element the Dutch Prosecutor used as a basis to develop his reasoning as 
to when vulnerability disclosure can be legitimate. Nonetheless, unlawfulness 
has not been incorporated in all 28 jurisdictions across the European Union. It is 
important, to note that in criminal law there is a general principle (also 
acknowledged in the European Commission Report addressing the 
transposition of the Cybercrime Directive) that there should be no criminal 
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liability for whatever action if this action is carried out with according rights. 
Therefore, even if unlawfulness is not incorporated in all 28 jurisdictions, there 
could be a potential workaround referring to general principles of criminal law.  
Across the European Union, criminal prosecution in most cases takes 
place ex officio, which means that there is no need for a complaint in order for the 
public prosecutor to prosecute, unless otherwise provided by law. In fact, if a 
crime can only be prosecuted upon a complaint by the victim, the law will 
explicitly provide for this. Therefore, in most jurisdictions examined, such as, for 
example, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Malta, given that the law does not 
provide otherwise, illegal access to a computer system can be prosecuted ex 
officio. The situation is different although in a limited number of member states, 
for example, in Germany and Greece where the law explicitly provides that 
illegal access to a computer system is only prosecuted following a complaint by 
the victim. 
Under Dutch law, illegal access is prosecuted ex officio. The question 
therefore arises how the Dutch prosecutor has been able to provide guidelines 
as to when security research constitutes illegal access, and allow for it to be 
prosecuted only under specific circumstances. In the Netherlands, the public 
prosecutor has the right to exercise prosecutorial discretion 
(opportuniteitsbeginsel). In a similar vein, in the UK, the Crown Prosecution 
Service has wide discretion in deciding when to prosecute. In order to do so, the 
Crown Prosecution Service should inter alia show that it is in the public interest 
to prosecute. There are guidelines that clarify the meaning of “public interest”, 
which among others provide that the Crown Prosecution Service will not 
prosecute bona fide security researchers even though it is considered a crime 
under the Computer Misuse Act to possess hacking tools. In other countries, 
such as France, while no prosecutorial discretion exists per se, there may be other 
ways to exercise discretion (e.g. the case of mediation penale in France). Finally, of 
course as a general principle in criminal law normally, if there is lack of 
evidence, the prosecutor would not be able to pursue the prosecution. Needless 
to say, however, while this issue of when to prosecute CVD arises in jurisdictions 
that illegal access is prosecute ex officio, in the case of member states where a 
complaint by the victim is required (e.g. Germany and Greece), the adoption of 
the policy such as the letter sent by the Dutch prosecutor on security research 
would of course be helpful guidance, but not necessary. 
Having examined a number of jurisdictions in terms of how they address 
vulnerability disclosure, it is worth mentioning the example of France where the 
legislature explicitly provides for the non-prosecution of a researcher who 
reveals a vulnerability to ANSSI (see Art. L. 2321-4 of the 2016 Loi pour République 
Numérique). The law, however, is quite detailed about how ANSSI acts upon 
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receipt of the information, and how it transmits this to the owner or the 
manufacturer of the information system.  
Finally, there is an important consideration when looking into the criminal 
law aspects of vulnerability disclosure. This consideration relates to the cross-
border nature of hacking given that there are no geographic silos as to where the 
researcher is located, and where he identifies the vulnerability. For example, 
security research may concern a computer system in the Netherlands, but the 
researcher may be located in Belgium. As a result, the researcher may be subject 
to the laws of both jurisdictions, and the question is (which unfortunately is 
pretty much left open) how to address the legal conundrum this creates as the 
researcher may not be subject to prosecution in the Netherlands, but s/he may 
be in Belgium. This consideration creates even further legal uncertainty, which 
when addressing security research should be taken into account as part of 
coordinated vulnerability disclosure.  
In sum, having examined the criminal law aspects of security research, 
one cannot but acknowledge that the positive example of the Dutch model 
underscores the importance of improving legal certainty among all the 
stakeholders involved and encouraging positive behaviour for coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure. However, even though in certain member states the 
legal validity of policies like those in the Netherlands may be able to stand (also 
and most importantly, in court), it is questionable how such policies would have 
a practical impact in the remaining jurisdictions where such policy documents 
would not be accepted in the judicial system. In addition, it goes without saying 
that even in the cases where a jurisdiction is involved where such policies would 
be meaningful (such as, for example, the Netherlands), if one must deal with 
other jurisdictions where the conditions for prosecuting illegal access (and 
therefore security research) are more stringent, then questions arise as to 
whether the researcher in question can avoid prosecution at all. It can therefore 
be easily concluded that member states need to coordinate closely as a step 
towards enhancing legal certainty as to the circumstances under which security 
research is prosecuted and vulnerability disclosure is coordinated. Sharing best 
practices is a first step, but it is important also to identify ways better to 
harmonise the applicable law at EU level (e.g. by considering potential changes 
to the cybercrime Directive, which has already been transposed in a very 
different manner in each of the member states).  
4.4. Data protection law 
Having discussed the criminal aspects of security research and software 
vulnerability disclosure we now turn to the civil aspects and other legal 
challenges that arise. As to data protection legislation, unlawful processing of 
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personally identifiable information is prohibited. Given the broad meaning of 
processing under EU legislation (and also under the most recently adopted and 
soon to come into force General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), security 
research may be illegal to the extent that the researcher who engages in security 
research also accesses personal data of the users stored in the relevant 
information system. CVD may include the processing of that personal data. 
Nonetheless, CVD can also help mitigate data protection and data security risks, 
and in fact is one of the good practices encouraged by data protection and other 
competent authorities as a means to promote compliance with GDPR. Indeed, 
the GDPR provides for a principles-based approach to data security, in which 
case encouraging CVD would actually be in compliance with the relevant 
legislation. 
4.5. Industrial property 
4.5.1. Copyright 
Another area of concern that mainly governs the relationship between the 
researcher and the software vendor is that of copyright law. In fact, researchers 
may be faced with claims that the information being disclosed includes portion 
of software code, and thus infringes the vendor’s copyright. In addition, under 
certain circumstances activities of the researchers engaging in security 
vulnerability disclosure may interfere with copyright holders’ right to prevent 
circumvention of digital rights management (DRM) technology applied on the 
software. 
The existing exemptions under EU copyright law (i.e. Directive 
2009/24/EC), such as those concerning the reproduction of the code and 
translation of the form for the purposes of achieving interoperability (i.e. reverse 
engineering), may not be applicable, especially because information obtained 
through this reverse engineering can only be used for interoperability purposes. 
Similarly, even if there is an exemption to use a copy of a software programme 
in order to observe, study or test its functioning to determine its ideas and 
principles, if security vulnerability disclosure involves reproduction, then 
engaging in any similar activity would not be permitted by EU copyright law. 
In the context of multiple finders or a feedback loop between finder and a 
reporting authority before official disclosure, the protection of copyright could 
prevent sharing vulnerability information from anyone other than the original 
vendor, thus making CVD legally challenging. It is worth noting that while in 
the United States, there is a security testing exemption provided in the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), there is no such thing in EU law. 
Nonetheless, academics even in the US consider that exemption for security 
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testing narrow and call for legal reforms to expand it to cover security 
vulnerability disclosure.  
4.5.2. Trade secrets 
On a number of occasions, independent researchers – especially those who may 
have previously worked for the vendor in question as an employee or consultant 
– may face trade-secret infringement claims. In those circumstances, the 
software vendor can possibly claim that his prior knowledge led him to his 
discovery, and therefore easily prove that there has been a trade secret 
infringement. 
The recently adopted trade secrets Directive does provide for a reverse 
engineering exemption as a means leading to lawful acquisition of trade secrets. 
This exemption though can be restricted in the End User Licence Agreement 
(EULA), which makes it less likely to apply in the case of security vulnerability 
disclosure.  
4.5.3. Patents 
While for the purposes of this report we will not enter into a debate as to when 
computer-implemented inventions can be patentable in the EU, in the case 
where such an argument can stand, a researcher may be pursued on the basis of 
patent infringement.  
The existing law does not provide for an exemption that would be 
applicable in the circumstances we are looking at. On this point, it is worth 
noting that the aborted draft computer-implemented inventions Directive in the 
early 2000s included an exemption for reverse engineering for interoperability 
purposes. 
4.5.4. Trademarks 
Even though they are less likely to prevail, it is true that under certain 
circumstances and given that a researcher may use a trademark for making a 
security vulnerability disclosure, s/he may be faced with a possibly legal claim 
that disclosure infringes on their trademarks. The researcher, however, can 
easily combat such claims by arguing that the use of the trademark is necessary 
to make the disclosure and there is no intention to confuse the consumers. 
4.6. Export control regulation 
Finally, under export control regulation, and in particular the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, a company wishing to sell “intrusion software” abroad needs to 
obtain a government license to export those items. Until recently, it was an open 
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE IN EUROPE | 49 
 
question as to the scope of this requirement, especially with respect to bug 
bounty programs and to zero-day exploits. In December 2017, however, a 
number of changes were made to the relevant part of the Arrangement to ensure 
only “software specially designed for command and control” of intrusion would 
be subject to export controls, and adding exemptions inter alia for software that 
carries out updates authorised by the owner or operator of the system, and 
explicitly to vulnerability disclosure or cyber incident response activities. The 
relevant EU legislation is currently being reviewed by the European Parliament 
and the Council based on a European Commission proposal presented in 
September 2016, and it remains to be seen if and how the recent changes to the 
Wassenaar Arrangement will impact the decision-making at EU level.  
4.7. Conclusion 
In sum, and having examined the legal challenges associated with security 
research and vulnerability disclosure, there are a number of open questions as 
to how to improve legal certainty with respect to the circumstances under which 
security research and vulnerability disclosure can be unlawful. Based on 
previous experience, policy changes may be more fruitful at least in the shorter 
term, but it is important to consider potential legal vehicles that could allow for 
security research to feed into a process of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure, 
provided that certain conditions are met. It does indeed require some fine-
tuning, with the aim of clearly defining any proposed exemptions (even, for 
example, in copyright law) to ensure that such exemptions are not misused by 
researchers, but also to provide some sort of “safe harbour” to the researcher. 
Therefore, any proposals should be handled with care.  
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5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
he analysis of this Task Force shows that only a few countries across 
Europe have managed to put SVD processes in place. The Netherlands 
has been the most proactive member state in establishing vulnerability 
disclosure policies and has supported other member states to address their 
challenges and concerns. Supported by the Dutch Ministry of Justice and 
Security and the Public Prosecution Service, which supports and advocates this 
process, the government has a proper framework in place, as well as clear 
processes for reporting vulnerabilities, including protection of the researcher. 
France has recently included vulnerability disclosure in its revised legislative 
framework – Law for a Digital Republic (Article 47) – even though it still lacks 
proper protection of the researcher. According to recent reports, Lithuania has 
joined these ranks by putting in place a vulnerability disclosure framework for 
a specific sector ("providers of public communications networks"), including a 
disclosure deadline, scheduled resolution and an acknowledgement report. In 
addition, some organisations in Lithuania have successfully established 
processes to receive and disseminate vulnerability information. 
A significant barrier to the implementation of CVD policies across the EU 
is the lack of a single interpretation of what constitutes ‘hacking’ among the 
member states, which has led to the conflation of this term – typically associated 
with cybercrime in the EU – with security research and its role in vulnerability 
discovery as opposed to vulnerability disclosure. Therefore, the first step is to 
provide the necessary legal certainty to security researchers involved in 
vulnerability discovery as well as setting appropriate vulnerability disclosure 
processes through complementary guidance and best practices. Based on 
current best practices in Europe, the US and Japan, the Task Force recommends 
implementation of the following CVD-related policies. 
CVD Policy 
The Task Force calls upon the European Commission and the member states to 
collectively draft a European-level framework complemented by national 
legislation in accordance with the guidelines and recommendations defined in 
ISO/IEC 29147:2014 and ISO/IEC 30111 in order to provide legal clarity for 
software vulnerability discovery and disclosure. The Nationaal Cyber Security 
Centrum (NCSC) in the Netherlands has published a general guideline for 
responsible disclosure, which can serve as a useful model that EU member states can 
T
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follow in drafting their own responsible disclosure policy. In addition, it gives 
reporters guidance on how to act in finding and reporting a vulnerability.54 
The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Template from the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the US 
Department of Commerce could also offer helpful suggestions.55 
It’s also worth mentioning that the Cybersecurity Unit, Computer Crime 
and Intellectual Property Section Criminal Division of the US Department of 
Justice, in July 2017 released the first version of the framework for a 
“Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Online Systems”56 that EU member states 
could examine as a possible model. Recognising that different organisations may 
have different goals and priorities for their vulnerability disclosure programs, 
the US framework does not dictate the form of or objectives for vulnerability 
disclosure. Instead, the framework outlines a process for designing a 
vulnerability disclosure programme that will clearly describe authorised 
vulnerability disclosure and discovery behaviour, thereby substantially 
reducing the likelihood that such described activities will result in a civil or 
criminal violation of law.  
The Task Force recommends that national CERTs (computer emergency 
response teams) should put in place frameworks that are similar to the ones 
adopted in the Netherlands and the US. Moreover, such frameworks should be 
prominently announced on the websites of organisations that establish a CVD, 
which researchers can consult and rely on for legal certainty. 
The Task Force suggests the steps outlined below for implementing 
coordinated vulnerability disclosure processes in Europe. 
Private sector 
The private sector could take the lead in implementing coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure defining and publishing on companies’ website public 
reporting mechanisms on vulnerabilities disclosure according to the ISO 
standards. The Netherlands Responsible Disclosure Guidelines, the NTIA 
template and the DOJ Vulnerability disclosure programs could also be followed 
as best practices.  
                                                        
54 See https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/news/responsible-disclosure-
guideline.html. 
55 See https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_vuln_disclosure_early_ 
stage_template.pdf. 
56 See https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/page/file/983996/download. 
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CERTs 
CERTs should help in putting in place a framework to implement coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure processes playing the role of thrusted third party and 
coordination center in this process. 
Member states 
Member states should act in creating the necessary legal certainty for security 
researchers involved in vulnerability discovery, changing national legislation to 
allow for the recognition of ethical hacking. 
EU  
The EU should change the European legislation to allow for legal certainty for 
security researchers involved in vulnerability discovery and to allow for the 
definition of common rules and procedures across member states to allow for a 
common process of software coordinated vulnerability disclosure in Europe. 
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
IMPLEMENTING CVD IN EUROPE 
6.1. Introduction 
There is a need to improve legal certainty surrounding CVD within the EU. 
ENISA’s “Good Practice Guide on Vulnerability Disclosure”, from January 2016, 
states: “One of the primary challenges […] is the need for an advanced legal 
landscape to ensure that vulnerability reporting is not endangered by the 
unintended consequences of criminal and civil legislation.” 
Moreover, there is also a lack of coordination between member states on 
their respective positions with respect to CVD (see differences in the 
transposition of Directive 2013/40), while sharing best practices is key to 
ensuring legal certainty. However, a number of member states and third 
countries are working on national solutions that could result in conflicting 
obligations for service providers. The current system is fragmented and 
generates legal uncertainty for all parties concerned: service providers, law 
enforcement and judicial authorities and also EU citizens.  
6.1.1. Opportunity cost 
Currently, there are many interpretations across Europe of what constitutes 
hacking, let alone ethical hacking. Given that the principle of territoriality does 
not apply to cyberspace, if the EU institutions do not try and harmonise this 
field, then Europe may end up in a situation in which its cybersecurity 
researchers suffer from a lack of legal protection. As a consequence, companies 
in certain countries will find that such researchers will not help them with CVD 
and vulnerabilities will go unreported, harming the Digital Single Market. 
6.1.2. What can be done at EU level? 
While the approach to CVD by member states is fragmented and needs 
harmonisation at EU level, the debate about how and to what extent to 
harmonise CVD is mostly absent. On the other hand, at this particular moment, 
early 2018, there are several pieces of cybersecurity-related legislation that are 
either in discussion in the EP and the Council (e.g. the EU Cybersecurity Act) or 
being transposed into national legislation (e.g. the NIS Directive). Therefore, 
CVD-related legislation may be integrated in the above in such a way that 
cybersecurity is enhanced in Europe. We give our recommendations below on 
how the EU legislative momentum might be used to promote CVD in a coherent 
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manner. One clear advantage of using this approach is that their legal bases are 
already established. 
6.2. EU legislation 
6.2.1. Amending Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information 
systems ( “EU cybercrime Directive”) to support CVD 
In the context of a potential future revision of the EU cybercrime Directive, the 
European Commission should consider an amendment to the Directive that 
would allow for CVD if certain circumstances prescribed by law are met, thereby 
creating a safe environment for security researchers community to report 
vulnerabilities that they identify. Such an amendment would ensure a more 
harmonized interpretation of the relevant rules across the EU, and the security 
researcher community would have a clearer idea of what constitutes or not an 
infringement of the relevant laws. 
6.2.2. Protection of security researchers 
Researchers involved in vulnerability discovery are often exposed to criminal or 
civil liability.57 The Task Force notes that there is no legal instrument at the 
European-level aimed at protecting security researchers and “white-hat 
hackers” from prosecution as part of vulnerability disclosure. Given the 
importance of their work to the overall security of society, the legal liability and 
responsibilities of security researchers should be fully clarified to enable them 
to continue their work without fear of prosecution.  
6.2.3. Incentives for security researchers 
This Task Force would welcome appropriate policies aimed at encouraging 
‘white-hat hackers’ to actively participate in coordinated vulnerability 
disclosure programs. No policy on this specific matter has yet been established 
at the EU level. 
6.2.4. Directive on security of network information systems 
Member states are currently developing their accompanying guidelines on the 
“technical and organisational measures” prescribed in Article 14 and falling 
with the scope of the NIS Directive. In this respect, a recent new draft of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework could be used as inspiration, as it includes the 
following subcategory of CVD: "RS.AN-5: Processes are established to receive, 
                                                        
57 See https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/25/hungarian-hacker-arrested-for-pressing-f12/. 
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analyse and respond to vulnerabilities disclosed to the organisation from 
internal and external sources (e.g. internal testing, security bulletins, or security 
researchers)”. Therefore, in transposing the NIS Directive, and in particular its 
Article 14, member states may explicitly consider including CVD as one of those 
measures. 
Furthermore, companies may proactively consider establishing a CVD as 
part of their own “technical and organisational measures”, since the NIS 
Directive leaves open the range of measures a company can take in order to 
ensure compliance with Article 14.  
Moreover, in a future review of the NIS Directive, member states could be 
encouraged to share information and best practices among themselves on CVD. 
In a similar vein, promoting CVD could be considered as an explicit objective on 
the part of member states when defining their national strategy on the security 
of network and information systems as provided in Article 7 of the NIS 
Directive. However, given the difficulties in fine-tuning the scope of CVD-
related legislative proposals (as mentioned in the section of this report 
concerning the legal challenges), the legislature should be cautious in putting 
forward such proposals, and make sure their provisions are clearly spelled out.  
6.2.5. General Data Protection Regulation 
The General Data Protection Regulation, which came into force in May 2018, 
offers some relevant points that could serve as vehicles to stimulate software 
vulnerability discovery and disclosure. According to the GDPR, software 
owners, vendors and tech firms become data controllers insofar as they process 
personal data within their systems. Assuming that irresponsible handling of 
vulnerabilities could lead to personal data breaches falling within the scope of 
GDPR, CVD can be an effective tool to mitigate relevant risks. 
When an unpatched vulnerability leads to the breach of personal data 
under Article 33 of the GDPR, a data controller may be subject to administrative 
fines and potentially other sanctions. In assessing the level of the fines, the 
authorities will take into account a number of factors as stipulated in Article 83 
paragraph 2, including the measures taken by controllers to avoid personal data 
breaches (e.g. how carefully the vulnerability was handled). Therefore, if a 
controller implements a CVD programme allowing vulnerabilities to be dealt 
with in a timely manner, then it may reduce the risk of incurring fines arising 
from possible personal data breaches.  
Furthermore, with respect to the open question as to if and when CVD 
may constitute unlawful processing of personal data, it is worth referring to 
recital 49, which seems to suggest that researchers may potentially be able to 
argue that to the extent they disclose such activities to the data controller in the 
context of CVD, such disclosure may fall within the scope of a legitimate interest 
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of the controller in preventing security breaches by fostering network and 
information security. It would therefore then be up to the data controller to 
demonstrate that CVD was implemented with the intention of ensuring a higher 
level of network and information security, thereby serving its legitimate interest. 
6.2.6. Cybersecurity Act 
According to the proposed Regulation submitted by the European Commission 
in October 2017 concerning the European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA) and cybersecurity certification (the Cybersecurity Act), in its 
coordination and capacity-building roles, ENISA can contribute to the 
harmonised development of CVD in the EU by having its mandate amended, 
thereby allowing it to engage in the following activities:  
o Writing EU-wide guidelines for the reporting process, addressing the 
issues it raised in its January 2017 “Good Practice Guide on Vulnerability 
Disclosure” report;58 
o Installing and operating a web portal where disclosure of software and 
hardware vulnerabilities can be coordinated at the European-level and 
contributed to anonymously. In the portal back-office ENISA would 
analyse the vulnerability, contact the owner/vendor/manufacturer of the 
software solution or hardware product, make sure that the vulnerability 
is safely patched, and keep a confidential record of all operations, in close 
coordination with ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers), 
CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams), and the CSIRT 
network, for which it provides the secretariat. An ‘assurance’ seal for 
owners/vendors/manufacturers could be explored.  
o Building a team of “white-hat hackers” who would conduct campaigns to 
assist EU member states and operators of essential services to mitigate 
software vulnerabilities, with the objective of increasing the security of all 
infrastructures; 
o Implementing training in all issues that may arise in the context of CVD, 
e.g. technical, legal, etc., to build capacity on CVD in the EU; and 
o Liaising formally with other key international actors on CVD in order to 
enhance cooperation, collaboration and the sharing of best practices. 
Furthermore, Article 47 (1)j of the Cybersecurity Act states that a European 
cybersecurity certification scheme is expected to include inter alia "rules 
concerning how previously undetected cybersecurity vulnerabilities in ICT 
products and services are to be reported and dealt with." This provision of the 
Cybersecurity Act provides the possibility to introduce CVD in a European 
                                                        
58 See https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/vulnerability-disclosure. 
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Cybersecurity Certification Scheme, which in fact may encourage CVD as a good 
practice. In addition, the scope of the Cybersecurity Certification Framework 
could explicitly cover the certification of processes that qualify as good practices 
in overall cybersecurity risk management, for instance as secondary guidance. 
In this manner, companies could be encouraged to deploy Coordinated 
Vulnerability Disclosure policies and have them certified. 
6.2.7. Software vulnerabilities in durable goods such as cars and medical 
devices 
The Commission should amend the Radio Equipment Directive so that article 3 
paragraph 3 provides that “radio equipment is cybersecure by design, by default 
and by implementation”. The Commission should incorporate the standards for 
vulnerability management (ISO 29174, 30111) directly into the CE mark system.  
6.3. National legislation 
Amending national legislation to support CVD. As a medium-to-long term 
solution and given that the revision of the EU cybercrime Directive (from 2013) 
may take several years, the Task Force recommends member states to consider 
amending their national legislation bearing on CVD, using the framework on 
CVD introduced in the Netherlands as a model. The Task Force acknowledges 
that such a recommendation may lead to certain discrepancies in the regulatory 
framework covering CVD across member states, but it would allow for the 
establishment of a safer environment for the security research community to 
report vulnerabilities until legislation addressing the relevant issues to a 
sufficient degree comes into effect at the EU level. 
6.4. National non-legislative activities 
Member states can also take direct action to support and enable CVD practices 
outside of legislation. One of the key challenges in the ecosystem is fostering 
awareness and adoption of good practices. At the end of the day, most software 
and systems are developed and maintained by the private sector. Relevant 
government agencies—or even regional governments—can highlight the 
importance of CVD as part of a cybersecurity risk program, and share 
documents to make it easier and cheaper for organisations to experiment with 
finding approaches that are fit for purpose. The examples cited above from the 
Dutch and US model aimed at awareness and adoption could be a good model.  
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Another issue concerns the legal question of CVD, as it pertains to anti-
hacking statutes. Agencies focused on justice and law enforcement can offer 
guidance, either in formal opinions and policies, or more flexible guidance 
documents.  
Leaders in the private sector can also play a role in helping their peers 
understand the value of CVD, and the path towards maturity. This could be an 
ideal project for emerging public-private partnerships: it is relatively 
lightweight, and requires relatively little investment, allowing for these efforts 
to demonstrate their value to both government and industry stakeholders. 
6.5. Framework programmes for research and innovation 
The Framework Programs for Research and Technological Development, also 
called Framework Programmes or abbreviated FP1 to FP7 with FP8 being named 
Horizon 2020, are funding programs created by the European Union/European 
Commission to support and foster research in the European Research Area. The 
specific objectives and actions vary between funding periods. In FP6 and FP7 
(2002-2013) focus was still on technological research, in Horizon 2020 (2014-
2020) the focus is on innovation, delivering economic growth faster and 
delivering solutions to end users that are often governmental agencies. The 
proposal for a Framework Programme 9 is currently being drafted by the 
European Commission and should be submitted for co-decision in the spring 
2018. 
There are several ways to leverage funding from these programmes to 
promote CVD among public and private researchers in Europe. For instance, the 
following H2020 calls described in the Work Programme 2018-2020 could be 
used to finance research and innovation in this area: 
 SU-ICT-03-2018: Establishing and operating a pilot project to create a 
Cybersecurity Competence Network to develop and implement a 
common Cybersecurity Research & Innovation Roadmap. The networks 
of competence centres could be used to put in place multidisciplinary 
consortia that would experiment with CVD under the framework of the 
project and come up with sound legislative recommendations as part of 
the roadmap to be delivered. 
 SU-DS02-2020: Management of cyber-attacks and other risks. This topic is 
not yet defined and will be the subject of a later amendment to the Work 
Program, where explicit mention to CVD could be introduced. 
 SU-DS03-2019-2020: Digital Security and privacy for citizens and Small 
and Medium Enterprises and Micro Enterprises. The Work Programme 
already states that “The proposals should develop targeted, user-friendly 
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and cost-effective solutions enabling SMEs & MEs to: i) dynamically 
monitor, forecast and assess their security, privacy and personal data 
protection risks55; ii) become more aware of vulnerabilities, attacks and 
risks that influence their business; iii) manage and forecast their security, 
privacy and personal data protection risks in an easy and affordable 
way;…”. 
 SU-DS04-2018-2020: Cybersecurity in the Electrical Power and Energy 
System (EPES): an armour against cyber and privacy attacks and data 
breaches. The Work Programme already states that “The proposals shall 
implement the following series of activities to make the electric system 
cyber secure: (i) assessing vulnerabilities and threats of the system in a 
collaborative manner (involving all stakeholders in the energy 
components provision supply chain)…”. 
 SU-DS05-2018-2019: Digital security, privacy, data protection and 
accountability in critical sectors. The Work Programme already states that 
“(1): In collaboration with all stakeholders in the healthcare ecosystem and 
CERTs/CSIRTs, develop dynamic vulnerability data basis for collecting, 
uploading, maintaining, and disseminating vulnerabilities of ICT-based 
medical systems, technologies, applications and services (enhancing the 
ICT generic ones e.g. NIST, MITRE)…”. 
The next Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, FP 9, could also 
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7. GOVERNMENT DISCLOSURE 
DECISION PROCESSES 
overnments learn about vulnerabilities in many ways: through their own 
research and development, by purchasing them, through intelligence 
work, or by reports from third parties. While vulnerabilities are the 
cause of significant security risks and harms to users, businesses, and even 
governments themselves, these same weaknesses can be exploited for law 
enforcement investigations, intelligence collection, and ‘offensive’ exploitation. 
The policies and practices to assess the risks and interests associated with 
disclosing a vulnerability immediately to the affected vendor(s) and/or 
manufacturer(s) or whether to delay disclosure will be referred to as a 
government vulnerability disclosure review process. Regardless of the timing of 
disclosure, when a government decides to disclose a vulnerability, that is when 
the process and norms of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) begins 
(discussed in detail above).  
When considering policies and practices concerning how governments 
make decisions about vulnerabilities, it is useful to distinguish between three 
areas of policy: 
1) Acquisition - how governments acquire knowledge about vulnerabilities  
2) Disclosure - how governments make decisions about how and whether to 
disclose a vulnerability immediately or to delay disclosure 
3) Exploitation - how governments may use vulnerabilities for operational 
or offensive purposes 
Government disclosure decision processes (GDDP), the topic of this chapter, 
address only this second area of policies, practices and disclosure. It is critical 
for governments to have robust, accountable and transparent policies in place in 
this area in order for companies and users to have trust and confidence that 
governments are responsibly managing any vulnerabilities that they learn 
about.  
Disclosing these vulnerabilities to affected vendors and manufacturers allows 
companies to:  
 patch them quickly;  
 increase the security, privacy, and safety of their systems and users;  
 reduce conflict and improve trust between companies and government; 
and 
G
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 benefit from external discovery of vulnerabilities in their products and 
systems that they may not otherwise have the resources to find, which is 
especially important for small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
Some governments have created inter-ministerial government vulnerability 
disclosure review processes to consider all of the relevant risks and interests 
associated with the decision whether to disclose a vulnerability that is not 
publicly known immediately to the appropriate vendor(s) or to delay disclosure. 
The US Government has the most extensively documented and, as far as we 
know, most robust government vulnerability disclosure review process in place 
(discussed in detail below).  
7.1. GDDP in Europe 
While the Task Force found evidence of practices and implemented models for 
coordinated vulnerabilities disclosure (CVD) in Europe, it is believed that only 
a few member states have GDDP in place. Germany is publicly discussing 
implementing a process, and the Netherlands and the UK have processes in 
some form or another. In practice, the only public information available to date 
on this process is the vulnerabilities equities process (VEP) in the US, which 
therefore becomes the reference model for any discussion about these activities. 
7.2. The US experience with GDDP  
The US Government’s process for reviewing and coordinating the disclosure of 
vulnerabilities that come to its attention is known as the Vulnerabilities Equities 
Process (VEP).  
History 
The origins of the VEP can be traced to the National Security Policy Directive 54, 
signed by President George W. Bush in 2008. The process was finalised in a 
document dated February 2010, but was not broadly or consistently 
implemented until April 2014, following the revelations of the Heartbleed 
vulnerability which is estimated to have affected two-thirds of the world’s web 
servers. At that time, the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator Michael 
Daniel announced in a blog post that he had “reinvigorated” the VEP. At this 
time, the VEP became operational. In November 2017, current White House 
Cybersecurity Coordinator Rob Joyce announced a new charter for the VEP, 
including many reforms to the process. For a full history of the VEP, see Annex 
2. 
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Mandate 
According to the 2017 VEP Charter: 
The Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP) balances whether to 
disseminate vulnerability information to the vendor/supplier in the 
expectation that it will be patched, or to temporarily restrict the 
knowledge of the vulnerability to the USG, and potentially other 
partners, so that it can be used for national security and law 
enforcement purposes, such as intelligence collection, military 
operations, and/or counterintelligence… In the vast majority of cases, 
responsibly disclosing a newly discovered vulnerability is clearly in the 
national interest. 
Notably, both the 2010 VEP Document and the 2017 VEP Charter have a 
presumption that most vulnerabilities will be disclosed immediately to the 
affected vendors and manufacturers, and that the government may only 
temporarily restrict knowledge of a vulnerability; this process is not intended to 
allow the government to permanently withhold disclosure.  
Options 
The 2017 VEP Charter contemplates several options available to the government 
when reviewing a vulnerability that comes to the government’s attention: 
 Full disclosure to the affected vendor(s) or manufacturer(s) 
 Disseminating mitigation information to certain entities without 
disclosing the particular vulnerability 
 Limiting use of the vulnerability by the US Government in some way 
 Informing US and allied government entities of the vulnerability at a 
classified level 
 Using indirect means to inform the vendor(s) or manufacturer(s) of the 
vulnerability 
 Other methods not specified 
Scope 
The 2017 VEP Charter makes clear that all parts of government (including 
government contractors) must submit vulnerabilities that they learn about to the 
VEP, and that the VEP applies to vulnerabilities in virtually all products and 
systems: 
This policy applies to all USG components and personnel (i.e. civilian, 
military and contractors) and includes Government off-the-shelf 
(GOTS), Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS), or other commercial 
information systems (to include open-source software), Industrial 
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Control Systems (ICS) or products, and associated systems such as 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed 
Control Systems (DCS). 
The 2017 VEP Charter further notes that this process is not intended to prevent 
US Government entities from taking immediate actions to protect its network(s) 
or warn entities actively threatened by a malicious cyber event, including 
ongoing unauthorised access to information systems. 
Membership 
In an effort to properly consider all of the risks and interests associated with the 
decision to restrict knowledge of a vulnerability, the VEP provides for the 
participation of several different government agencies. The VEP Director is the 
White House Cybersecurity Coordinator. Other permanent members of the 
Equities Review Board (the deliberation body of the VEP) include 
representatives from: 
 Office of Management and Budget 
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (to include Intelligence 
Community-Security 
 Coordination Center (IC-SCC)) 
 Department of the Treasury 
 Department of State 
 Department of Justice (to include the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF)) 
 Department of Homeland Security (to include the National Cybersecurity 
Communications and Integration Center (NCCIC) and the United States 
Secret Service (USSS)) 
 Department of Energy 
 Department of Defense (including the National Security Agency (NSA) 
(including Information Assurance and Signals Intelligence elements)), 
United States Cyber Command, and DoD Cyber Crime Center (DC3)) 
 Department of Commerce 
 Central Intelligence Agency 
Notably, this list includes agencies that have missions to defend consumer, 
business, critical infrastructure and government security (i.e. this process is not 
limited to law enforcement and intelligence agencies). 
The 2017 VEP Charter also allows for other USG agencies to participate in 
the VEP when demonstrating responsibility for, or identifying equity in, a 
vulnerability under deliberation. 
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Each agency participating in the VEP designates an agency point of 
contact (POC) to act as the focal point for vulnerability submissions for their 
respective organisation and the primary contact for the VEP Executive 
Secretariat. The VEP POC further ensures one or more Subject Matter Experts 
(SME) from their agency are identified to support equities determinations and 
discussions as needed. 
Threshold and process 
All US government components and personnel (i.e. civilian, military and 
contractors) must submit a vulnerability to the VEP (by notifying the VEP 
Executive Secretariat) of any vulnerability that is newly discovered and not 
publicly known. These terms are defined in the 2017 VEP Charter as follows: 
Newly discovered: After February 16, 2010, the effective date of the 
initial Vulnerabilities Equities Process, when the USG discovers a zero-
day vulnerability or new zero-day vulnerability information, it will be 
considered newly discovered. 
Not publicly known: A vulnerability is considered publicly known if 
the vendor is aware of its existence and/or vulnerability information 
can be found in the public domain (e.g., published documentation, 
Internet, trade journals). 
When an agency determines that a vulnerability reaches this threshold for entry 
into the process, it will notify the VEP Executive Secretariat as soon as is 
practicable and provide its recommendation to either disseminate or restrict the 
vulnerability. The submission will include, at a minimum, information 
describing the vulnerability, identification of the vulnerable products or 
systems, and a recommendation on dissemination of the vulnerability 
information. 
The 2017 VEP Charter prescribes the following process, as diagrammed in 
Figure 4): 
 The VEP Executive Secretariat will notify VEP POCs within one day of 
notification of a vulnerability.  
 Agencies with equities then have five days to respond to the 
recommendation of the agency that submitted the vulnerability into the 
process.  
 Any disagreement on the recommendation to disclose the vulnerability 
immediately to the affected vendor(s) or manufacturer(s) or to restrict 
knowledge of the vulnerability will be discussed by the SMEs and the VEP 
Executive Secretariat within seven days. If there is no consensus between 
the SMEs and the VEP Executive Secretariat, then recommendations will 
be prepared for consideration by the Equities Review Board. 
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 The Equities Review Board will meet monthly, but may also be convened 
sooner if an immediate need arises.  
 The 2017 VEP Charter states that “ERB determinations for follow-on 
actions and next steps should be reached in a timely fashion. When there 
is consensus among those agencies that claimed an equity, the timeline 
will be shortened.” Decisions of the Equities Review Board are generally 
to be made by consensus. If consensus is not possible, Equities Review 
Board members will vote. 
 Decisions of the Equities Review Board may be contested within five days 
by notifying the VEP Executive Secretariat. Disputes arising from the VEP, 
including any challenges by an agency to a preliminary determination by 
the ERB, will be resolved using the process described in National Security 
Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-4, of 4 April 2017, Organization of the 
National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and 
Subcommittees. 
 Decisions to restrict dissemination of information about a vulnerability 
will be reassessed at least annually until dissemination is accomplished, 
the vulnerability is publicly known, or the vulnerability is otherwise 
mitigated. 
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Figure 4. Overview of vulnerabilities equity process in the US 
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The 2017 VEP Charter also provides instructions for when a US government 
agency learns that a vulnerability that the VEP has restricted knowledge of is 
used by a third party. In these situations, the agency will immediately report this 
information to the VEP Executive Secretariat. In such circumstances, the 
discussion of the vulnerability’s equities will begin no later than the business 
day following notification to the VEP Executive Secretariat, and participants will 
expeditiously reach a consensus on disclosure or appropriate mitigation actions, 
or raise issues to the Equities Review Board.  
Considerations 
The 2017 VEP Charter lists several equity considerations that must be taken into 
account by VEP participants for each vulnerability that is submitted to the VEP 
for review. These considerations are: 
 
Part 1 – Defensive equity considerations 
1.A. Threat considerations 
 Where is the product used? How widely is it used? 
 How broad is the range of products or versions affected? 
 Are threat actors likely to exploit this vulnerability, if it were known 
to them? 
 
1.B. Vulnerability considerations 
 What access must a threat actor possess to exploit this vulnerability? 
 Is exploitation of this vulnerability alone sufficient to cause harm? 
 How likely is it that threat actors will discover or acquire knowledge 
of this vulnerability? 
 
1.C. Impact considerations 
 How much do users rely on the security of the product? 
 How severe is the vulnerability? What are the potential consequences 
of exploitation of this vulnerability? 
 What access or benefit does a threat actor gain by exploiting this 
vulnerability? 
 What is the likelihood that adversaries will reverse engineer a patch, 
discover the vulnerability and use it against unpatched systems? 
 Will enough USG information systems, US businesses and/or 
consumers actually install the patch to offset the harm to security 
caused by educating attackers about the vulnerability? 
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1.D. Mitigation considerations 
 Can the product be configured to mitigate this vulnerability? Do other 
mechanisms exist to mitigate the risks from this vulnerability? 
 Are impacts of this vulnerability mitigated by existing best-practice 
guidance, standard configurations, or security practices? 
 If the vulnerability is disclosed, how likely is it that the vendor or 
another entity will develop and release a patch or update that 
effectively mitigates it? 
 If a patch or update is released, how likely is it to be applied to 
vulnerable systems? How soon? What percentage of vulnerable 
systems will remain forever unpatched or unpatched for more than a 
year after the patch is released? 
 Can exploitation of this vulnerability by threat actors be detected by 
USG or other members of the defensive community? 
 
Part 2 – Intelligence, law enforcement and operational equity considerations 
2.A. Operational value considerations 
 Can this vulnerability be exploited to support intelligence collection, 
cyber operations or law enforcement evidence collection? 
 What is the demonstrated value of this vulnerability for intelligence 
collection, cyber operations, and/or law enforcement evidence 
collection? 
 What is its potential (future) value? 
 What is the operational effectiveness of this vulnerability? 
 
2.B. Operational impact considerations 
 Does exploitation of this vulnerability provide specialized operational 
value against cyber threat actors or their operations? Against high-
priority National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) or military 
targets? For protection of war fighters or civilians? 
 Do alternative means exist to realize the operational benefits of 
exploiting this vulnerability? 
 Would disclosing this vulnerability reveal any intelligence sources or 
methods?  
Part 3 – Commercial equity considerations 
 If USG knowledge of this vulnerability were to be revealed, what risks 
could that pose for USG relationships with industry? 
Part 4 – International partnership equity considerations 
72 | GOVERNMENT DISCLOSURE DECISION PROCESSES 
 If USG knowledge of this vulnerability were to be revealed, what risks 
could that pose for USG international relations? 
 
Importantly, none of these considerations is framed as red lines. In that regard, 
these considerations are not outcome-determinative, but they do have value in 
providing guidance to VEP participants to ensure that they are considering 
relevant risks and interests.  
Disclosure 
When the VEP participants determine that a vulnerability should be disclosed 
to the affected vendor(s) or manufacturer(s), the 2017 VEP Charter instructs that 
disclosure is to be made “in the most expeditious manner and when possible 
within 7 days. Disclosure of vulnerabilities submitted for equity review will be 
conducted according to agreed-upon guidelines that are consistently and 
responsibly followed by all members.” The agency that submits the 
vulnerability to the VEP is presumed to know the most about the vulnerability 
and is generally responsible for disseminating information about the 
vulnerability to the affected vendor(s) or manufacturer(s), but the agency may 
delegate this responsibility to another agency. Agencies are instructed to 
disclose vulnerabilities consistent with international standards and/or current 
best practices, and/or take additional actions to reduce risk (i.e. in line with CVD 
norms and processes). If the affected vendor(s) or manufacturer(s) does not 
address the vulnerability or does not address the vulnerability with sufficient 




Vulnerabilities reported by security researchers or through incident response 
activity (e.g. US CERT/CC) will not be submitted to VEP.  
The following categories will also not be considered to be part of the 
vulnerability evaluation process: 
 Misconfiguration or poor configuration of a device that sacrifices security 
in lieu of availability, ease of use or operational resiliency 
 Misuse of available device features that enables non-standard operation 
 Misuse of engineering and configuration tools, techniques and scripts that 
increase/decrease functionality of the device for possible nefarious 
operations 
 Stating/discovering that a device/system has no inherent security 
features by design 
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The 2017 VEP Charter also provides for certain classified exceptions to the 
process: 
The United States Government’s decision to disclose or restrict 
vulnerability information could be subject to restrictions by partner 
agreements and sensitive operations. Vulnerabilities that fall within 
these categories will be catalogued by the originating Department/ 
Agency internally and reported directly to the Chair of the ERB. The 
details of these categories are outlined in Annex C, which is classified. 
Quantities of excepted vulnerabilities from each department and 
agency will be provided in ERB meetings to all members.  
Oversight and accountability 
The VEP Executive Secretariat produces an annual report that is submitted to 
the VEP POCs, the National Security Council, and the White House 
Cybersecurity Coordinator. The 2017 VEP Charter instructs that the report “will 
be written at the lowest classification level permissible and will include, at a 
minimum, an executive summary written at an unclassified level. As part of a 
commitment to transparency, annual reporting may be provided to the 
Congress.” The annual report will include statistical data as deemed appropriate 
by the VEP Director and will include any changes to: 
 Equities Review Board membership 
 Reassignment of the VEP Director responsibility to another position and 
 Realignment of the VEP Executive Secretariat responsibility to another 
agency 
7.3. Recommendations for establishing GDDP in the EU 
Throughout their everyday functionality, governments often have unique 
insight into vulnerabilities. Thus, ensuring that governments and their agencies 
have strong policies for reviewing and coordinating the disclosure of 
vulnerabilities is a critical norm that should be advanced within the EU. Yet, it 
appears that most member states currently lack a government vulnerability 
disclosure review process. 
Recognising the key role that finding and responsibly addressing 
vulnerabilities plays in cybersecurity, the NIS Directive aimed to facilitate 
information sharing from companies to governments. However, this mechanism 
is of little benefit if it remains a one-way street or if this process is limited only 
to critical infrastructure. We must ensure that there are robust, accountable, and 
transparent systems in place to ensure that member states are sharing 
information about vulnerabilities in any ICT products, networks, or systems 
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back out to affected vendors and manufacturers, as well as maintaining 
transparency regarding these activities towards the public. 
We recommend that all member states implement policies and practices 
for their government institutions and agencies with the following characteristics: 
 All security vulnerabilities are subject to a GDDP.59 
 All relevant ministries, including those with missions for user, business, 
and government security, should participate in the GDDP and 
participants should work together using a standard set of criteria to ensure 
all risks and interests are considered. 
 The policies, practices, and determinations of the GDPP should be subject 
to independent oversight and transparency. 
 The executive secretariat of the GDPP should be housed within a civilian 
agency with expertise in existing coordinated vulnerability disclosure. 
 The GDDP should be codified in law or other legally binding policy to 
ensure compliance and permanence. 
 The default policy should be to disclose vulnerabilities immediately to the 
affected vendor(s) so they can be patched.  
 Where the vulnerability potentially affects the safety of regulated 
products (such as cars, medical devices or railway signals, the relevant EU 
safety and standards bodies should be involved in the GDDP. 
ENISA can play a vital role in sharing best practices around government 
vulnerability disclosure review processes and assisting and advising member 
states in implementing such processes.  
The EU Cybersecurity Act offers a unique opportunity to advance the 
norm that member states should have robust, accountable, and transparent 
GDDP, thereby fostering greater cooperation, coordination and resilience in 
Europe 
Survey of member states 
It may also be useful for the European Commission or ENISA to conduct a study 
of member states’ efforts to implement a government disclosure decision 
processes. A better understanding of how member states are handling 
vulnerabilities will contribute to a more robust conversation about cybersecurity 
                                                        
59  Vulnerabilities identified through security researcher activity and incident 
response that are intended to be disclosed in a rapid fashion should not be subject 
to adjudication by GDDP. 
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in Europe and the types of measures that are needed to improve coordination 
and cooperation in the EU around cybersecurity incidents. 
In these questions, “government disclosure decision processes” mean 
governmental process for reviewing vulnerabilities that a government or any of 
its affiliated bodies learns about in order to determine whether a vulnerability 
should be disclosed to the affected vendor(s) immediately or whether disclosure 
should be delayed. Government vulnerability disclosure process” may also have 
a role in coordinating the actual disclosure of the vulnerability to the affected 
vendor(s).  
1. Does the member state have an established GDDP? 
a. If so, which agencies/ministries/departments/etc. of the member 
state regularly participate? 
b. If so, which agencies/ministries/departments/etc., if any, are 
required to submit vulnerabilities that they learn about to the 
government vulnerability disclosure review process? 
c. If so, is the process mandatory or voluntary?  
d. If so, where is the process established/articulated?  
e. If the member state does not have an established government 
vulnerability review process, what actions has the member state 
taken in order to ensure it is handling vulnerabilities responsibly? 
2. If a decision to disclose a vulnerability is made, how is it disclosed? What 
are the member state’s policies and practices for informing and 
coordinating the disclosure of vulnerabilities that it learns about to 
affected vendors and manufacturers? 
3. What policies and practices has the member state adopted to coordinate 
and cooperate with other member states and the EU institutions on 
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8. CONCLUSIONS: IT’S TIME TO ACT 
ybersecurity is the talk of the town. It is regularly invoked with a growing 
sense of urgency in the most important fora across the globe. The 
European Union, in particular, is facing a number of cyberattacks, which 
are increasing exponentially in quantity and in quality since they come from 
both non-state and state actors. Unless the EU improved its own cybersecurity, 
the risk will increase with the digital transformation. Billions of IOT devices 
(internet of things) are expected to be connected to the internet and software will 
become omnipresent in our lives. But software and software-based products 
have inherent vulnerabilities. Each of these weaknesses could allow an attacker 
to compromise the integrity of the product and exploit it for personal gain. 
Moreover, with the development of the IOT, the attack surface is becoming 
broader, which greatly increases the potential impact of vulnerabilities on the 
ecosystem.  
Software vulnerabilities therefore pose a serious concern for everyone and 
require the development of ad-hoc policies to coordinate the disclosure of 
vulnerabilities. The analysis of this Task Force shows that only a few countries 
across Europe have managed to put software vulnerability disclosure processes 
in place, but many others have discussions underway and are working to do so. 
Therefore, common action from the European institutions could help to 
jumpstart coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) and government 
disclosure decision processes (GDDP) across Europe. A significant barrier to the 
implementation of CVD policies across the EU is the lack of a single 
interpretation of what constitutes ‘hacking’ among the member states. 
Therefore, the first step is to provide the necessary legal certainty to security 
researchers involved in vulnerability discovery as well as setting appropriate 
vulnerability disclosure processes through complementary guidance and best 
practices. Based on current best practices in Europe, the US and Japan, the Task 
Force recommends implementation of the following CVD-related policies. 
8.1. CVD policies 
The Task Force calls upon the European Commission and the member states to 
collectively draft a European-level framework complemented by national 
legislation in accordance with the guidelines and recommendations defined in 
ISO/IEC 29147:2014 and ISO/IEC 30111 in order to provide legal clarity for 
software vulnerability discovery and disclosure. The Nationaal Cyber Security 
Centrum (NCSC) in the Netherlands has published a general guideline for 
C
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responsible disclosure, which can serve as a useful model that EU member states can 
follow in drafting their own responsible disclosure policy.60 
The Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Template from the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the US 
Department of Commerce and the “Vulnerability Disclosure Program for Online 
Systems from the Cybersecurity Unit, Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section Criminal Division of the US Department of Justice could also 
offer helpful suggestions. The Task Force suggests the steps outlined below for 
implementing coordinated vulnerability and government vulnerability 
disclosure processes in Europe. 
Private sector 
The private sector could take the lead in implementing coordinated 
vulnerability disclosure by defining and publishing public reporting 
mechanisms on vulnerabilities disclosure on companies’ websites, according to 
the ISO standards. The Netherlands Responsible Disclosure Guidelines, the 
NTIA template and the DOJ Vulnerability disclosure programs could also be 
followed as best practices. 
CERTs 
Computer emergency response teams (or CERTs) should help to put in place a 
framework to implement coordinated vulnerability disclosure processes, 
playing the role of a trusted third party and coordination center in this process. 
EU member states 
Member states should create the necessary legal certainty for security 
researchers involved in vulnerability discovery, changing national legislation to 
allow for the recognition of ethical hacking. 
EU institutions 
The EU should change the European legislation to ensure legal certainty for 
security researchers involved in vulnerability discovery and to allow for 
common rules and procedures across member states, which would pave the way 
for a common process of coordinated vulnerability disclosure in Europe. 
The list below presents the recommendations that have been agreed upon 
by the Task Force members in the course of their deliberations  
                                                        
60 See https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/news/responsible-disclosure-
guideline.html. 
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8.2. Recommendations for the implementation of CVD in 
Europe 
8.2.1. EU legislation 
1. Amend Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems 
(the EU cybercrime Directive) to allow the smooth and rapid 
development of CVD. 
2. Protection of security researchers. Researchers involved in vulnerability 
discovery are often exposed to criminal or civil liability. The legal liability 
and responsibilities of security researchers should be fully clarified to 
enable them to continue their work without fear of prosecution. 61  
3. Incentives for security researchers. Appropriate policies should be 
adopted with the aim of encouraging ‘white-hat hackers’ to actively 
participate in coordinated vulnerability disclosure programs.  
4. Directive on security of network information systems (NIS). In 
transposing the NIS Directive, particularly its Article 14, member states 
may explicitly consider including CVD as one of the technical and 
organisational measures.  
5. General data protection Regulation (GDPR). According to the GDPR, 
software owners and tech firms become data controllers when they 
exercise overall control over the purpose for which, and the manner in 
which personal data are processed. Assuming that irresponsible handling 
of vulnerabilities could lead to personal data breaches falling within the 
scope of GDPR, CVD should be viewed as an effective tool to mitigate the 
relevant risks.  
6. Cybersecurity Act. The proposed Regulation submitted by the European 
Commission in October 2017 concerning the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) and cybersecurity certification 
notes that ENISA, in its coordination and capacity-building roles, can 
contribute to the harmonised development of CVD in the EU by having 
its mandate amended, thereby allowing it to engage in the following 
activities:  
 Writing EU-wide guidelines for the reporting process, addressing 
the issues it raised in its January 2017 “Good Practice Guide on 
Vulnerability Disclosure” report;62; 
                                                        
61  See for instance https://blog.rapid7.com/2015/10/28/new-dmca-exemption-is-a-
positive-step-for-security-researchers/ 
62 See https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/vulnerability-disclosure.  
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 Installing and operating a web portal where disclosure of software 
and hardware vulnerabilities can be coordinated at the European 
level and contributed to anonymously;  
 Building a team of ‘white-hat hackers’ who would conduct 
campaigns to assist EU member states and operators of essential 
services to mitigate software vulnerabilities, with the objective of 
increasing the security of all infrastructures; 
 Implementing training in all issues that may arise in the context of 
CVD, e.g. technical, legal, etc., to build capacity on CVD in the EU; 
and 
 Liaising formally with other key international actors on CVD in 
order to enhance cooperation, collaboration and the sharing of best 
practices. 
Furthermore, Article 47 (1)j of the Cybersecurity Act states that a European 
cybersecurity certification scheme is expected to include inter alia "rules 
concerning how previously undetected cybersecurity vulnerabilities in ICT 
products and services are to be reported and dealt with." This provision of the 
Cybersecurity Act provides the possibility to introduce CVD in a European 
Cybersecurity Certification Scheme, which in fact may encourage CVD as a 
standard practice.  
7. Software vulnerabilities in durable goods, such as cars and medical 
devices. 
 The European Commission should amend the Radio Equipment 
Directive so that Art. 3, paragraph 3 provides that “radio equipment 
is cybersecure by design, by default and by implementation”. 
 The European Commission should incorporate the standards for 
vulnerability management (ISO 29174, 30111) directly into the CE 
mark system.  
 
8.2.2. National legislation 
Amending national legislation to support CVD. As a medium-to-long-term 
solution and given that the revision of the EU cybercrime Directive (from 2013) 
may take several years, the Task Force advises member states to consider 
amending their national legislation bearing on CVD, using the framework on 
CVD introduced in the Netherlands as a model. 
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8.2.3. EU research funding 
8. Framework Programs for Research and Innovation. The various 
European Framework Programs for Research and Innovation offer several 
ways to leverage funding to promote CVD among public and private 
researchers in Europe. For instance, the following H2020 calls described 
in the Work Programme 2018-2020 could be used to finance research and 
innovation in this area: 
 SU-ICT-03-2018: Establishing and operating a pilot project to create 
a Cybersecurity Competence Network  
 SU-DS02-2020: Management of cyber-attacks and other risks  
 SU-DS03-2019-2020: Digital security and privacy for citizens and 
small and medium enterprises and micro enterprises 
 SU-DS04-2018-2020: Cybersecurity in the Electrical Power and 
Energy System (EPES)  
 SU-DS05-2018-2019: Digital security, privacy, data protection and 
accountability in critical sectors  
The next Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, FP9, 
should also provide explicit funding for CVD across Europe. 
8.3. Recommendations to implement government disclosure 
decisions processes (GDDP) in Europe 
In the course of their day-to-day functioning, governments often acquire 
insights into vulnerabilities. Thus, ensuring that governments and their agencies 
have strong policies for reviewing and coordinating the disclosure of 
vulnerabilities is a critical norm that should be advanced within the EU. It 
appears, however, that most member states have not yet implemented a 
government vulnerability disclosure review process. 
GDDP characteristics. The Task Force recommends that all member states 
adopt the following policies and practices to inform the GDDP activities of their 
government institutions and agencies: 
9. All security vulnerabilities should be subject to a government disclosure 
decision process.63 
10. All relevant ministries, including those with missions for user, business 
and government security, should participate in the GDDP and 
                                                        
63 Vulnerabilities identified through security researcher activity and incident response that 
are intended to be disclosed in a rapid fashion should not be subject to adjudication by GDDP. 
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participants should work together using a standard set of criteria to ensure 
that all risks and interests are considered. 
11. The policies, practices and determinations of the GDDP review should be 
subject to independent oversight and transparency. Regular public 
reporting should be viewed as a critical part of this. 
12. The executive secretariat of the GDDP should be housed within a civilian 
agency with expertise in existing coordinated vulnerability disclosure. 
13. The GDDP should be codified into law or other legally binding policy to 
ensure compliance and permanence. 
14. Any non-disclosure agreement with contractors, resellers or security 
researchers should be prohibited. 
15. Any decision to delay disclosure of a vulnerability should be reviewed at 
least every six months. 
16. The default policy should be to disclose vulnerabilities immediately to the 
affected vendor(s) so they can be patched.  
17. Where the vulnerabilities potentially affect the safety of regulated 
products (such as cars, medical devices or railway signals), the relevant 
RU safety and standards bodies should be involved in the GDDP. 
 
ENISA can play a vital role in sharing best practices in GVD review processes 
and in assisting and advising member states in their implementation. 
Survey of member states’ GDDP. It might also be useful for the European 
Commission or ENISA to conduct a study of member states’ efforts to 
implement a GDDP. A better understanding of how member states are handling 
vulnerabilities will contribute to a more robust and informed debate about 
cybersecurity in Europe and the types of measures that are needed to improve 
coordination and cooperation vis-á-vis cybersecurity incidents in the EU.  
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ANNEX II. TIMELINE OF THE US 
GOVERNMENT’S VULNERABILITIES 
EQUITIES PROCESS  
January 2008. President George W. Bush signed the National Security Policy 
Directive 54 (NSPD 54), which called for a US-government-wide effort called the 
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). CNCI required the 
Departments of State, Defence, Homeland Security and Justice, as well as the 
Director of National Intelligence, to develop “a joint plan for the coordination 
and application of offensive capabilities to defend US information systems”. 
2008. The joint plan coming out of the CNCI notes that the discovery of 
vulnerabilities “may present competing equities for [government] offensive and 
defensive mission interests” and recommended that “actions taken in response 
to knowledge of a specific vulnerability must be coordinated to ensure the needs 
of each of these ‘equities’ are addressed”. The joint plan recommended the 
development of a “Vulnerabilities Equities Process,” but the tasks assigned to 
the VEP in the joint plan remain classified. 
2008-09. Starting in 2008, in accordance with the joint plan’s recommendation, 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) set up a working group 
to develop the VEP. The working group included representatives from ODNI, 
the National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence 
Agency, Justice Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of 
Defense, Department of State, Department of Energy, and Department of 
Homeland Security. The working group developed a document known as the 
“Commercial and Government Information Technology and Industrial Control 
Product or System Vulnerability Equities Policy and Process” (the VEP 
Document). The VEP Document is dated 16 February 2010. 
11 April 2014. Bloomberg published an article claiming that the NSA had, for two 
years, been exploiting a vulnerability called Heartbleed which is estimated to 
have affected two thirds of the world’s web servers - any server that used the 
popular OpenSSL cryptographic library. 
28 April 2014. White House Cybersecurity Coordinator Michael Daniel 
published a blog post denying that the government had prior knowledge of 
Heartbleed and discussing how he is “reinvigorating” the VEP. It is widely 
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believed that the VEP was not operational at this time. Before the VEP was 
operationalized, it appears that various Federal agencies ran their own processes 
-- notably, the NSA had long run a process to navigate the potentially conflicting 
missions of its Information Assurance and Signals Intelligence Directorates. 
6 May 2014. EFF filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to obtain all 
records pertaining to the VEP. 
15 December 2014. EFF received first (heavily redacted) batch of responsive 
documents, continued to get additional documents over the next year. 
14 January 2016. EFF received a largely unredacted description of the VEP 
including the VEP Document following litigation to compel response to their 
May 6, 2014 FOIA. 
March 2016. The FBI contracted with a security firm to break into an iPhone used 
by the San Bernardino shooter, in the midst of a high profile lawsuit to force 
Apple to write software to unlock the security features on the phone. 
27 April 2016. The FBI released a statement saying the Bureau will not submit 
the iOS vulnerability in question for review by the VEP, saying it did not possess 
enough information about how it worked. 
17 May 2017. Following one of the largest global cyberattacks in history 
(WannaCry), U.S. Senators Schatz, Johnson, and Gardner and U.S. 
Representatives Lieu and Farenthold introduce the Protecting our Ability to 
Counter Hacking (PATCH) Act, bipartisan legislation that would reform and 
codify the VEP. 
15 November 2017. White House Cybersecurity Coordinator Rob Joyce 





























This report puts forward the analysis and recommendations for the design and 
implementation of a forward-looking policy on software vulnerability disclosure 
(SVD) in Europe. It is the result of extensive deliberations among the members 
of a Task Force formed by CEPS in September 2017, including industry experts, 
representatives of EU and international institutions, academics, civil society 
organisations and practitioners.
Drawing on current best practices throughout Europe, the US and Japan, the 
Task Force explored ways to formulate practical guidelines for governments 
and businesses to harmonise the process of handling SVD throughout Europe. 
These discussions led to policy recommendations addressed to member states 
and the EU institutions for the development of an effective policy framework 
for introducing coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD) and government 
disclosure decision processes (GDDP) in Europe. 
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